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Abstract
Partially synchronous Byzantine consensus protocols typically structure their execution into a
sequence of views, each with a designated leader process. The key to guaranteeing liveness in these
protocols is to ensure that all correct processes eventually overlap in a view with a correct leader for
long enough to reach a decision. We propose a simple view synchronizer abstraction that encapsulates
the corresponding functionality for Byzantine consensus protocols, thus simplifying their design. We
present a formal specification of a view synchronizer and its implementation under partial synchrony,
which runs in bounded space despite tolerating message loss during asynchronous periods. We show
that our synchronizer specification is strong enough to guarantee liveness for single-shot versions
of several well-known Byzantine consensus protocols, including HotStuff, Tendermint, PBFT and
SBFT. We furthermore give precise latency bounds for these protocols when using our synchronizer.
By factoring out the functionality of view synchronization we are able to specify and analyze the
protocols in a uniform framework, which allows comparing them and highlights trade-offs.
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1 Introduction
The popularity of blockchains has renewed interest in Byzantine consensus protocols, which
allow a set of processes to reach an agreement on a value despite a fraction of the processes
being malicious. Unlike proof-of-work or proof-of-stake protocols underlying many blockchains,
classic Byzantine consensus assumes a fixed set of processes, but can in exchange provide
hard guarantees on the finality of decisions. Byzantine consensus protocols are now used in
blockchains with both closed membership [9, 30] and open one [14, 15, 29], in the latter case
by running Byzantine consensus inside a committee elected among blockchain participants.
These use cases have motivated a wave of new algorithms [14, 30, 40] that improve on classical
solutions, such as DLS [26] and PBFT [19].
Designing Byzantine consensus protocols is challenging, as witnessed by a number of bugs
found in recent protocols [1, 4, 7, 17]. Historically, researchers have paid more attention to
safety of these protocols rather than liveness: e.g., while PBFT came with a safety proof [18],
the nontrivial mechanism used to guarantee its liveness has never had one. However, achieving
liveness of Byzantine consensus is no less challenging than its safety. The seminal FLP result
shows that guaranteeing both properties is impossible when the network is asynchronous [27].
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Hence, consensus protocols aim to guarantee safety under all circumstances and liveness only
when the network is synchronous. The expected network behavior is formalized by the partial
synchrony model [26]. In one of its more general formulations [21], the model guarantees that
after some unknown Global Stabilization Time (GST) the system becomes synchronous, with
message delays bounded by an unknown constant δ and process clocks tracking real time.
Before GST, however, messages can be lost or arbitrarily delayed, and clocks at different
processes can drift apart without bound. This behavior reflects real-world phenomena: in
practice, the space for buffering unacknowledged messages in the communication layer is
bounded, and messages will be dropped if this space overflows; also, clocks are synchronized
by exchanging messages (e.g., using NTP), so network asynchrony will make clocks diverge.
Byzantine consensus protocols usually achieve liveness under partial synchrony by dividing
execution into views (aka rounds), each with a designated leader process responsible for
driving the protocol towards a decision. If a view does not reach a decision (e.g., because its
leader is faulty), processes switch to the next one. To ensure liveness, the protocol needs to
guarantee that all correct processes will eventually enter the same view with a correct leader
and stay there long enough to complete the communication required for a decision. Achieving
such view synchronization is nontrivial, because before GST, clocks that could measure
the duration of a view can diverge, and messages that could be used to bring processes
into the same view can get lost or delayed. Thus, by GST processes may end up in wildly
different views, and the protocol has to bring them back together, despite any disruption
caused by Byzantine processes. Some of the Byzantine consensus protocols integrate the
functionality required for view synchronization with the core consensus protocol, which
complicates their design [14, 19]. In contrast, both the seminal DLS work on consensus under
partial synchrony [26] and some of the more recent work [3, 37, 40] suggest separating the
complex functionality required for view synchronization into a distinct component – view
synchronizer, or simply synchronizer. This approach allows designing Byzantine protocols
modularly, with mechanisms for ensuring liveness reused among different protocols.
However, to date there has been no rigorous analysis showing which properties of a
synchronizer would be sufficient for modern Byzantine consensus protocols. Furthermore,
the existing implementations of synchronizer-like abstractions are either expensive or do
not handle partial synchrony in its full generality. In particular, DLS [26] implements view
synchronization by constructing clocks from program counters of processes. Since these
counters drift apart on every step, processes need to frequently synchronize their local clocks.
This results in prohibitive communication overheads and makes this solution impractical.
Abraham et al. [3] address this inefficiency by assuming hardware clocks with a bounded
drift, but only give a solution for a synchronous system. Finally, recent synchronizers by
Naor et al. [37] only handle a simplified variant of partial synchrony which disallows clock
drift and message loss before GST.
In this paper we make several contributions that address the above limitations:
We propose a simple and precise specification of a synchronizer abstraction sufficient for
single-shot consensus (§3). The specification ensures that from some point on after GST,
all correct processes go through the same sequence of views, overlapping for some time in
each one of them. It precisely characterizes the duration of the overlap and gives bounds
on how quickly correct processes switch between views.
We propose a synchronizer implementation, called FastSync, and rigorously prove that it
satisfies our specification. FastSync handles the general version of the partial synchrony
model [26], allowing for an unknown δ and – before GST – unbounded clock drift and
message loss (§3.1). Despite the latter, the synchronizer runs in bounded space – a key
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feature under Byzantine failures, because the absence of a bound on the required memory
opens the system to denial-of-service attacks. Our synchronizer also does not use digital
signatures, relying only on authenticated point-to-point links.
We show that our synchronizer specification is strong enough to guarantee liveness under
partial synchrony for single-shot versions of a number of Byzantine consensus protocols.
All of these protocols can thus achieve liveness using a single synchronizer – FastSync.
In the paper we consider in detail HotStuff [40] (§4.1) and its two-phase version similar
to Tendermint [14] (§4.2); in an appendix (§B) we also analyze PBFT [19], SBFT [30]
and Tendermint itself. The precise guarantees about the timing of view switches provided
by our specification are key to handle such a wide range of protocols.
We provide a precise latency analysis of FastSync, showing that it quickly converges
to a synchronized view (§3.2). Building on this analysis, we prove worst-case latency
bounds for the above consensus protocols when using FastSync. Our bounds consider
both favorable and unfavorable conditions: if the protocol executes during a synchronous
period, they determine how quickly all correct processes decide; and if the protocol starts
during an asynchronous period, how quickly the processes decide after GST.
Most of the protocols we consider were originally presented in a form optimized for
solving consensus repeatedly. By specializing them to the standard single-shot consensus
problem and factoring out the functionality required for view synchronization, we are
able to succinctly capture their core ideas in a uniform framework. This allows us to
easily compare the protocols and to shed light on trade-offs between them.
2 System Model
We assume a system of n = 3f + 1 processes, out of which at most f can be Byzantine,
i.e., can behave arbitrarily. In the latter case the process is faulty; otherwise it is correct.
We call a set Q of 2f + 1 processes a quorum and write quorum(Q) in this case. Processes
communicate using authenticated point-to-point links and, when needed, can sign messages
using digital signatures. We denote by 〈m〉i a message m signed by process pi. We sometimes
use a cryptographic hash function hash(), which must be collision-resistant: the probability
of an adversary producing inputs m and m′ such that hash(m) = hash(m′) is negligible.
Processes are equipped with clocks to measure timeouts. We denote the set of time points
by Time (ranged over by t) and assume that local message processing takes zero time.
We consider a generalized partial synchrony model [21, 26], where after some time GST
message delays between correct processes are bounded by a constant δ, and both GST and
δ are unknown to the protocol. Before GST messages can get arbitrarily delayed or lost
(although for simplicity we assume that self-addressed messages are never lost). Assuming
that both GST and δ are unknown to the protocol (as in [21]) reflects the requirements
of practical systems, whose designers cannot accurately predict when network problems
leading to asynchrony will stop and what the latency will be during the following synchronous
period. We also assume that the processes are equipped with hardware clocks that can
drift unboundedly from real time before GST, but do not drift thereafter (our results can be
trivially adjusted to handle bounded clock drift after GST, but we omit this for conciseness).
3 Synchronizer Specification and Implementation
We now define a view synchronizer interface sufficient for single-shot Byzantine consensus,
and present its specification and implementation. Let View = {1, 2, . . .} be the set of views,
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ranged over by v; we sometimes use 0 to denote an invalid view. The job of the synchronizer
is to produce notifications new_view(v) at each correct process, telling it to enter view v. A
process can ensure that the synchronizer has started operating by calling a special start()
function. We assume that each correct process eventually calls start().
For a consensus protocol to terminate, its processes need to stay in the same view for
long enough to complete the message exchange leading to a decision. Since the message delay
δ after GST is unknown to the protocol, we need to increase the view duration until it is long
enough. To this end, the synchronizer is parameterized by a function defining this duration –
F : View ∪ {0} → Time, which is monotone, satisfies F (0) = 0, and increases unboundedly:
∀θ.∃v.∀v′. v′ ≥ v =⇒ F (v′) > θ. (1)
The properties on the left of Figure 1 define our synchronizer specification (ignore the
properties on the right for the time being). The specification strikes a balance between
usability and implementability. On one hand, it is sufficient to prove the liveness of a range of
consensus protocols (as we show in §4). On the other hand, it can be efficiently implemented
under partial synchrony by our FastSync synchronizer (§3.1).
Ideally, a synchronizer should ensure that all correct processes overlap in each view v for
a duration determined by F (v). However, achieving this before GST is impossible due to
network and clock asynchrony. Therefore, we require a synchronizer to provide nontrivial
guarantees only after GST and starting from some view V. To formulate the guarantees
we use the following notation. Given a view v that was entered by a correct process pi, we
denote by Ei(v) the time when this happens; we let Efirst(v) and Elast(v) denote respectively
the earliest and the latest time when some correct process enters v. We let Sfirst and Slast
be respectively the earliest and the latest time when some correct process calls start(),
and Sk the earliest time by which k correct processes do so. Thus, a synchronizer must
guarantee that views may only increase at a given process (Property 1), and ensure view
synchronization starting from some view V, entered after GST (Property 2). Starting from
V, correct processes do not skip any views (Property 3), enter each view v ≥ V within at
most d of each other (Property 4) and stay there for a determined amount of time: until
F (v) after the first process enters v (Property 5). Our FastSync implementation satisfies
Property 4 for d = 2δ. Properties 4 and 5 imply a lower bound on the overlap between the
time intervals during which all correct processes execute in view v:
∀v ≥ V. Efirst(v + 1)− Elast(v) ≥ (Efirst(v) + F (v))− (Efirst(v) + d) = F (v)− d. (2)
Due to (1), the overlap increases unboundedly as processes keep switching views. Byzantine
consensus protocols are often leader-driven, with leaders rotating round-robin across views.
Hence, (2) allows us to prove their liveness by showing that there will eventually be a view
with a correct leader (due to Property 3) where all correct processes will overlap for long
enough. Having separate Properties 4 and 5 instead of a single property in (2) is required to
prove the liveness of some protocols, e.g., two-phase HotStuff (§4.2) and Tendermint (§4.3).
3.1 FastSync: a Bounded-Space Synchronizer for Partial Synchrony
In Figure 2 we present our FastSync synchronizer, which satisfies the synchronizer spec-
ification on the left of Figure 1 for d = 2δ. Despite tolerating message loss before GST,
FastSync only requires bounded space; it also does not rely on digital signatures.
FastSync measures view duration using a timer timer_view: when the synchronizer
tells the process to enter a view v, it sets the timer for the duration F (v). When the
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time
Efirst(v)
GST
≥ F(v)+훿
≤ 2훿 ≥ F(v)-2훿Elast(v) Efirst(v+1) Elast(v+1)
≥ F(v)
1. ∀i, v, v′. (Ei(v) and Ei(v′) are defined)∧
v < v′ =⇒ Ei(v) < Ei(v′)
2. Efirst(V) ≥ GST
3. ∀i.∀v ≥ V. pi is correct =⇒ pi enters v
4. ∀v ≥ V. Elast(v) ≤ Efirst(v) + d
5. ∀v ≥ V. Efirst(v + 1) ≥ Efirst(v) + F (v)
A. ∀v ≥ V. Elast(v + 1) ≤ Elast(v) + F (v) + δ
B. Sfirst ≥ GST ∧ F (1) > 2δ =⇒
V = 1 ∧ Elast(1) ≤ Slast + δ
C. F (GV(GST+ ρ) + 1) > 2δ ∧ Sf+1 ≤ GST+ ρ =⇒
V = GV(GST+ ρ) + 1 ∧
Elast(V) ≤ GST+ ρ+ F (V − 1) + 3δ
Figure 1 Synchronizer properties (holding for some V ∈ View) and their visual illustration.
Properties on the left specify the synchronizer abstraction, sufficient to ensure consensus liveness.
Properties on the right give latency bounds specific to our FastSync synchronizer (§3.1). The latter
satisfies Property 4 for d = 2δ. The parameter ρ is the retransmission interval used by FastSync.
timer expires, the synchronizer does not immediately move to the next view v′; instead, it
disseminates a special WISH(v′) message, announcing its intention. Each process maintains
an array max_views : {1, . . . , n} → View ∪ {0}, whose j-th entry stores the maximal view
received in a WISH message from process pj (initially 0, updated in line 13). Keeping track
of only the maximal views allows the synchronizer to run in bounded space. The process
also maintains two variables, view and view+, derived from max_views (initially 0, updated
in lines 14 and 15): view+ (respectively, view) is equal to the maximal view such that at least
f + 1 processes (respectively, 2f + 1 processes) wish to switch to a view no lower than this.
The two variables monotonically increase and we always have view ≤ view+.
The process enters the view determined by the view variable (line 19) when the latter
increases (view > prev_v in line 16; we explain the extra condition later). At this point the
process also resets its timer_view (line 18). Thus, a process enters a view only if it receives
a quorum of WISHes for this view or higher, and a process may be forced to switch views
even if its timer_view has not yet expired. The latter helps lagging processes to catch up,
but poses another challenge. Byzantine processes may equivocate, sending WISH messages to
some processes but not others. In particular, they may send WISHes for views ≥ v to some
correct process, helping it to form a quorum of WISHes sufficient for entering v. But they may
withhold the same WISHes from another correct process, so that it fails to form a quorum for
entering v, as necessary, e.g., for Property 4. To deal with this, when a process receives a
WISH that makes its view+ increase, the process sends WISH(view+) (line 21). By the definition
of view+, at least one correct process has wished to move to a view no lower than view+.
The WISH(view+) message replaces those that may have been omitted by Byzantine processes
and helps all correct processes to quickly form the necessary quorums of WISHes.
An additional guard on entering a view is view+ = view in line 16, which ensures that a
process does not enter a “stale” view such that another correct process already wishes to
enter a higher one. Similarly, when the timer of the current view expires (line 4), the process
sends a WISH for the maximum of view+1 and view+. In other words, if view = view+, so that
the values of the two variables have not changed since the process entered the current view,
then the process sends a WISH for the the next view (view + 1). Otherwise, view < view+,
and the process sends a WISH for the higher view view+.
To deal with message loss before GST, a process retransmits the highest WISH it sent
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1 function start()
2 if view+ = 0 then
3 send WISH(1) to all;
4 when timer_view expires
5 send WISH(max(view + 1, view+))
to all;
6 periodically
7 if timer_view is enabled then
8 send WISH(view+) to all;
9 else if max_views[i] > 0 then
10 send WISH(max(view + 1, view+))
to all;
11 when received WISH(v) from pj
12 prev_v, prev_v+ ← view, view+;
13 if v > max_views[j] then max_views[j]← v;
14 view ← max{v | ∃k.max_views[k] = v ∧
|{j | max_views[j] ≥ v}| ≥ 2f + 1};
15 view+ ← max{v | ∃k.max_views[k] = v ∧
|{j | max_views[j] ≥ v}| ≥ f + 1};
16 if view+ = view ∧ view > prev_v then
17 stop_timer(timer_view);
18 start_timer(timer_view, F (view));
19 trigger new_view(view);
20 if view+ > prev_v+ then
21 send WISH(view+) to all;
Figure 2 The FastSync synchronizer. The periodic handler is invoked every ρ units of time.
every ρ units of time, according to its local clock (line 6). Depending on whether timer_view
is enabled, the WISH is computed as in lines 21 or 5. Finally, the start function ensures that
the synchronizer has started operating at the process by sending WISH(1), unless the process
has already done so in line 21 due to receiving f + 1 WISHes from other processes.
Discussion. FastSync requires only O(n) variables for storing views. When proving its
correctness, we establish that every view is entered by some correct process (Lemma 18 in
§A), and eventually, correct processes do not skip views (Property 3). These two properties
limit the power of the adversary to exhaust the value space for views, similarly to [11].
The basic mechanisms we use in our synchronizer – entering views supported by 2f + 1
WISHes and relaying views supported by f + 1 WISHes – are similar to the ones used in
Bracha’s algorithm for reliable Byzantine broadcast [13]. However, Bracha’s algorithm only
makes a step upon receiving a set of identical messages. Thus, its naive application to view
synchronization [37, §A.2] requires unbounded space to store the views v for which the
number of received copies of WISH(v) still falls below the threshold required for delivery or
relay. Moreover, tolerating message loss would require a process to retain a copy of every
message it has broadcast, to enable retransmissions. FastSync can be viewed as specializing
the mechanisms of Bracha broadcast to take advantage of the particular semantics of WISH
messages, by keeping track of only the highest WISH received from each process and by acting
on sets of WISHes for non-identical views. This allows tolerating message loss before GST in
bounded space and without compromising liveness, as illustrated by the following example.
We first show that, before GST, we may end up in the situation where processes are split
as follows: a set P1 of f correct processes entered v1, a set P2 of f correct processes entered
v2 > v1, a correct process pi entered v2 + 1, and f processes are faulty. To reach this state,
assume that all correct processes manage to enter view v1 and then all messages between
P1 and P2 ∪ {pi} start getting lost. The f faulty processes help the processes in P2 ∪ {pi}
to enter all views between v1 and v2, by providing the required WISHes (line 16), while the
processes in P1 get stuck in v1. After the processes in P2 ∪ {pi} time out on v2, they start
sending WISH(v2 + 1) (line 5), but all messages directed to processes other than pi get lost,
so that the processes in P2 get stuck in v2. The faulty processes then help pi gather 2f + 1
messages WISH(v2 + 1) and enter v2 + 1 (line 16).
Assume now that GST occurs, the faulty processes go silent and the correct processes
time out on the views they are in. Thus, the f processes in P1 send WISH(v1 + 1), the f
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processes in P2 send WISH(v2 + 1), and pi sends WISH(v2 + 2) (line 10). The processes in
P1 eventually receive the WISHes from P2 ∪ {pi}, so that they set view+ = v2 + 1 and send
WISH(v2 + 1) (line 21). Note that here processes act on f + 1 mismatching WISHes, unlike in
Bracha broadcast. Eventually, the processes in P1 ∪ P2 receive 2f copies of WISH(v2 + 1) and
one WISH(v2 + 2), which causes them to set view = v2 + 1 and enter v2 + 1 (line 16). Note
that here processes act on 2f + 1 mismatching WISHes, again unlike in Bracha broadcast.
Finally, the processes P1∪P2 time out and send WISH(v2 +2) (line 5), which allows all correct
processes to enter v2 + 2. Acting on sets of mismatching WISHes is crucial for liveness in this
example: if processes only accepted matching sets, like in Bracha broadcast, message loss
before GST would cause them to get stuck, and they would never converge to the same view.
3.2 Correctness and Latency Bounds of FastSync
As we demonstrate shortly, the synchronizer specification given by Properties 1-5 in Figure 1
serves to prove that consensus eventually reaches a decision. However, FastSync also
satisfies some additional properties that allow us to quantify how quickly this happens under
both favorable and unfavorable conditions. We list these properties on the right of Figure 1.
I Theorem 1. FastSync satisfies all properties in Figure 1 for d = 2δ.
Due to space constraints, we defer the proof to §A. Property A allows us to quantify the
cost of switching between several views (e.g., due to faulty leaders). This is formalized by
the following proposition, easily proved using Property A by induction on v′.
I Proposition 2. ∀v, v′.V ≤ v ≤ v′ =⇒ Elast(v′) ≤ Elast(v) +
∑v′−1
k=v (F (k) + δ).
Property B guarantees that, when the synchronizer starts after GST (Sfirst ≥ GST) and
the initial timeout is long enough (F (1) > 2δ), processes synchronize in the very first view
(V = 1) and enter it within δ of the last correct process calling start().
Let the global view at time t, denoted GV(t), be the maximum view entered by a correct
process at or before t, or 0 if no view was entered by a correct process. Property C quantifies
the latency of view synchronization in a more general case when the synchronizer may
be started before GST. The property depends on the interval ρ at which the synchronizer
periodically retransmits its internal messages to deal with possible message loss. The property
considers the highest view GV(GST + ρ) a correct process has at time GST + ρ and ensures
that all correct processes synchronize in the immediately following view within at most
ρ+ F (V − 1) + 3δ after GST. This is guaranteed under an assumption that the timeout of
this view exceeds 2δ and f + 1 correct processes call start() early enough. Since GST can
be arbitrary, in principle, so can be the view V and, thus due to (1), the timeout F (V − 1).
However, practical implementations usually stop increasing timeouts when they exceed a
reasonable value. Hence, Property C guarantees that to reach V, processes need to wait for
at most a single maximal timeout.
4 Liveness and Latency of Byzantine Consensus Protocols
We show that our synchronizer abstraction allows ensuring liveness and establishing latency
bounds for several consensus protocols. The protocols solve a variant of Byzantine consensus
problem that relies on an application-specific valid() predicate to indicate whether a value is
valid [16, 23]. In the context of blockchain systems a value represents a block, which may be
invalid if it does not include correct signatures authorizing its transactions. Assuming that
each correct process proposes a valid value, each of them has to decide on a value so that:
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Agreement. No two correct processes decide on different values.
Validity. A correct process decides on a valid value, i.e., satisfying valid().
Termination. Every correct process eventually decides on a value.
4.1 Single-Shot HotStuff
We first consider the HotStuff protocol [40], underlying the upcoming Libra cryptocurrency [2].
The protocol was originally presented as solving an inherently multi-shot problem, agreeing
on a hash-chain of blocks. In Figure 3 we present its single-shot version that concisely
expresses the key idea and allows comparing the protocol with others. For brevity, we
eschew the use of threshold signatures, which makes the communication complexity of a
leader change O(n2) rather than O(n), like in the original HotStuff. This complexity is still
better than that of PBFT, which is O(n3). We handle linear versions of the protocols we
consider in §C. HotStuff delegated view synchronization to a separate component [40], but
did not provide its practical implementation or analyze how view synchronization affects the
protocol latency. We show that our single-shot version of HotStuff is live when used with a
synchronizer satisfying the specification in §3 and give precise bounds on its latency. We also
show that the protocol requires only bounded space when using our synchronizer FastSync.
The protocol in Figure 3 works in a succession of views produced by the synchronizer.
Each view v has a fixed leader leader(v) = p((v−1) mod n)+1 that is responsible for proposing a
value to the other processes, which vote on the proposal. A correct leader needs to choose its
proposal carefully so that, if a value was decided in a previous view, the leader will propose
the same value. To enable the leader to do this, when a process receives a notification to
move to a view v (line 1), it sends a NEWLEADER message to the leader of v with information
about the latest value it accepted in a previous view (as described in the following). The
process also stores the view v in a variable curr_view, and sets a flag voted to false, to
record that it has not yet received any proposal from the leader in the current view. The
leader computes its proposal (as described in the following) based on a quorum of NEWLEADER
messages (line 5) and sends the proposal, along with some supporting information, in a
PROPOSE message to all processes (for uniformity, including itself).
The leader’s proposal is processed in three phases. A process receiving a proposal x
from the leader of its view v (line 11) first checks that voted is false, so that it has not yet
accepted a proposal in v. It also checks that x satisfies a SafeProposal predicate (explained
later), which ensures that a faulty leader cannot reverse decisions reached in previous views.
The process then sets voted to true and stores x in curr_val.
Since a faulty leader may send different proposals to different processes, the process next
communicates with others to check that they received the same proposal. To this end, the
process disseminates a PREPARED message with the hash of the proposal it received. The
process then waits until it gathers a set C of PREPARED messages from a quorum with a hash
matching the proposal (line 16); we call this set of messages a prepared certificate for the value
and check it using the prepared predicate. The process stores the proposal in prepared_val,
the view in which it formed the prepared certificate in prepared_view, and the certificate itself
in cert. At this point we say that the process prepared the value. Since a certificate consists
of at least 2f + 1 PREPARED messages and there are 3f + 1 replicas in total, it is impossible
to prepare different values in the same view: this would require some correct process to send
two PREPARED messages with different values in the same view, which is impossible due to
the check on the voted flag in line 12. Formally, let us write wf(C) (for well-formed) if the
set of correctly signed messages C have been sent in the execution of the protocol.
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1 upon new_view(v)
2 curr_view← v;
3 voted← false;
4 send 〈NEWLEADER(curr_view, prepared_view,
prepared_val, cert)〉i to leader(curr_view);
5 when received {〈NEWLEADER(v, viewj , valj ,
certj)〉j | pj ∈ Q} =M for a quorum Q
6 pre: curr_view = v ∧ pi = leader(v) ∧
(∀m ∈M.ValidNewLeader(m));
7 if ∃j.viewj = max{viewk | pk ∈Q} 6=0 then
8 send 〈PROPOSE(v, valj , certj)〉i to all;
9 else
10 send 〈PROPOSE(v, myval(),⊥)〉i to all;
11 when received 〈PROPOSE(v, x, _)〉j = m
12 pre: curr_view = v ∧ voted = false ∧
SafeProposal(m);
13 curr_val← x;
14 voted← true;
15 send 〈PREPARED(v, hash(curr_val))〉i to all;
16 when received {〈PREPARED(v, h)〉j |
pj ∈ Q} = C for a quorum Q
17 pre: curr_view = v ∧ voted = true ∧
hash(curr_val) = h;
18 prepared_val← curr_val;
19 prepared_view← curr_view;
20 cert← C;
21 send 〈PRECOMMITTED(v, h)〉i to all;
22 when received {〈PRECOMMITTED(v, h)〉j |
pj ∈ Q} for a quorum Q
23 pre: curr_view= prepared_view= v ∧
hash(curr_val) = h;
24 locked_view← prepared_view;
25 send 〈COMMITTED(v, h)〉i to all;
26 when received {〈COMMITTED(v, h)〉j |
pj ∈ Q} for a quorum Q
27 pre: curr_view = locked_view = v ∧
hash(curr_val) = h;
28 decide(curr_val);
prepared(C, v, h) ⇐⇒ ∃Q. quorum(Q) ∧ C = {〈PREPARED(v, h)〉j | pj ∈ Q}
ValidNewLeader(〈NEWLEADER(v′, v, x, C)〉_) ⇐⇒ v < v′ ∧ (v 6= 0 =⇒ prepared(C, v, hash(x)))
SafeProposal(〈PROPOSE(v, x, C)〉i) ⇐⇒ pi = leader(v) ∧ valid(x) ∧
(locked_view 66= 0 =⇒ x = prepared_val ∨ (∃v′. v > v′ > locked_view ∧ prepared(C, v′, hash(x))))
Figure 3 Single-shot HotStuff. All variables storing views are initially set to 0 and others to ⊥.
I Proposition 3. ∀v, C,C ′, x, x′. prepared(C, v, hash(x)) ∧ prepared(C ′, v, hash(x′)) ∧
wf(C) ∧ wf(C ′) =⇒ x = x′.
Preparing a value is a prerequisite for deciding on it. Hence, by Proposition 3 a prepared
certificate for a value x and a view v guarantees that x is the only value that can be possibly
decided in v. For this reason, it is this certificate, together with the corresponding value
and view, that the process sends upon a view change to the new leader in a NEWLEADER
message (line 4). The leader makes its proposal based on a quorum of NEWLEADER messages
with prepared certificates formed in lower views than the one it is in (line 5), as checked by
ValidNewLeader. Similarly to Paxos [33] and PBFT [19], the leader selects as its proposal
the value prepared in the highest view, or, if there are no such values, its own proposal given
by myval(). In the former case, the leader sends the corresponding certificate in its PROPOSE
message, to justify its choice; in the latter case this is replaced by ⊥.
Once a process prepares a value x, it participates in the next message exchange: it
disseminates a PRECOMMITTED message with the hash of the value and waits until it gathers a
quorum of PRECOMMITTED messages matching the prepared value (line 22). This ensures that
at least f + 1 correct processes have prepared the value x. Since the leader of the next view
will gather prepared commands from at least 2f + 1 processes, at least one correct process
will tell the leader about the value x, and thus the leader will be aware of this value as a
potential decision in the current view.
Having gathered a quorum of PRECOMMITTED messages for a value, the process becomes
locked on this value, which is recorded by setting a special variable locked_view to the current
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view. From this point on, the process will not accept a proposal of a different value from
a leader of a future view, unless the leader can convince the process that no decision was
reached in the current view. This is ensured by the SafeProposal check the process does on a
PROPOSE message from a leader (line 12). This checks that the value is valid and that, if the
process has previously locked on a value, then either the leader proposes the same value, or
its proposal is justified by a prepared certificate from a higher view than the lock. In the
latter case the process can be sure that no decision was reached in the view it is locked on.
Having locked a value, the process participates in the final message exchange: it dissemi-
nates a COMMITTED message with the hash of the value and waits until it gathers a quorum of
matching COMMITTED messages for the locked value (line 26). Once this happens, the process
decides on this value. Gathering a quorum of COMMITTED messages on a value x ensures that
at least f + 1 correct processes are locked on the same value. This guarantees that a leader
in a future view cannot get processes to decide on a different value: this would require 2f + 1
processes to accept the leader’s proposal; but at least one correct process out of these would
be locked on x and would refuse to accept a different value due to the SafeProposal check.
Thus, while the exchange of PRECOMMITTED messages ensures that a future correct leader will
be aware of the value being decided and will be able to make a proposal passing SafeProposal
checks (liveness), the exchange of COMMITTED ensures that a faulty leader cannot revert the
decision (safety).
Since processes transition through increasing views (Property 1 in Figure 1), we get
I Proposition 4. The variables locked_view, prepared_view and curr_view at a correct process
never decrease and we always have locked_view ≤ prepared_view ≤ curr_view.
Note that, when a process enters view 1, it trivially knows that no decision could have
been reached in prior views. Hence, the leader of view 1 can send its proposal immediately,
without waiting to receive a quorum of NEWLEADER messages (line 10), and processes can
avoid sending these messages to this leader. For brevity, we omit this optimization from the
pseudocode, even though we take it into account in our latency analysis.
Since the synchronizer is not guaranteed to switch processes between views all at the
same time, a process in a view v may receive a message from a higher view v′ > v, which
needs to be stored in case the process finally switches to v′. If implemented naively, this
would require a process to store unboundedly many messages. Instead, we allow a process to
store, for each message type and sender, only the message of this type received from this
sender that has the highest view. As we show below (Theorem 5), this does not violate
liveness. Thus, assuming consensus proposals of bounded size, the protocol Figure 3 runs in
bounded space, and so does the overall consensus protocol with the FastSync synchronizer.
We defer the proof that the protocol satisfies Validity and Agreement to §B.1 and focus
on our core contribution: proving its liveness and analyzing its latency.
Protocol liveness. Assume that the protocol is used with a synchronizer satisfying Proper-
ties 1-5 on the left of Figure 1; to simplify the following latency analysis, we assume d = 2δ,
as for FastSync. The next theorem states requirements on a view sufficient for the protocol
to reach a decision and quantifies the resulting latency.
I Theorem 5. Let v ≥ V be a view such that F (v) > 7δ and leader(v) is correct. Then in
single-shot HotStuff all correct processes decide in view v by Elast(v) + 5δ.
Proof. By Property 2 we have Efirst(v) ≥ GST, so that all messages sent by correct processes
after Efirst(v) get delivered to all correct processes within δ. Once a correct process enters v,
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it sends its NEWLEADER message, so that leader(v) will receive a quorum of such messages by
Elast(v)+δ. When this happens, the leader will send its proposal in a PROPOSE message, which
correct processes will receive by Elast(v) + 2δ. If they deem the proposal safe, it takes them
at most 3δ to exchange the sequence of PREPARED, PRECOMMITTED and COMMITTED messages.
By (2), all correct processes will stay in v until at least Elast(v) + (F (v)− d) > Elast(v) + 5δ,
and thus will not send a message with a view > v until this time. Thus, none of none of the
above messages will be discarded at correct processes before this time, and assuming the
safety checks pass, the sequence of message exchanges will lead to decisions by Elast(v) + 5δ.
It remains to show that the proposal leader(v) makes in view v (line 5) will satisfy
SafeProposal at all correct processes (line 11). It is easy to show that the proposal satisfies
valid, so we now need to prove the last conjunct of SafeProposal. This trivially holds if no
correct process is locked on a value when receiving the PROPOSE message from the leader.
We now consider the case when some correct process is locked on a value when receiving
the PROPOSE message, and let pi be a process that is locked on the highest view among
correct processes. Let x = pi.prepared_val be the value locked and v0 = pi.locked_view < v
be the corresponding view. Since pi locked x at v0, it must have previously received
messages PRECOMMITTED(v0, hash(x)) from a quorum of processes (line 22), at least f + 1 of
which have to be correct. The latter processes must have prepared the value x at view v0
(line 16). By Proposition 4, when each of these f + 1 correct processes enters view v, it has
prepared_view ≥ v0 and thus sends the corresponding value and its prepared certificate in
the NEWLEADER(v, . . .) message to leader(v). The leader is guaranteed to receive at least one
of these messages before making a proposal, since it only does this after receiving at least
2f + 1 NEWLEADER messages (line 5). Hence, the leader proposes a value x′ with a prepared
certificate formed at some view v′ ≥ v0 no lower than any view that a correct process is
locked on when receiving the leader’s proposal. Furthermore, if v′ = v0, then by Proposition 3
we have that x′ = x and x is the only value that can be locked by a correct process at v0.
Hence, the leader’s proposal will satisfy SafeProposal at each correct process. uunionsq
Since by Property 3 correct processes enter every view starting from V and, by the
definition of leader(), leaders rotate round-robin, we are always guaranteed to encounter a
correct leader after at most f view changes. Then Theorem 5 implies that the protocol is
live when using a timeout function F that grows without bound.
I Corollary 6. Let F be such that (1) holds. Then in single-shot HotStuff all correct processes
eventually decide.
Protocol latency. When single-shot HotStuff is used with the FastSync synchronizer,
rather than an arbitrary one, we can use Properties A-C on the right of Figure 1 to bound
how quickly the protocol reaches a decision after GST. To this end, we combine Theorem 5
with Property C, which bounds the latency of view synchronization, and Proposition 2, which
bounds the latency of going through up to f views with faulty leaders.
I Corollary 7. Let v = GV(GST + ρ) + 1 and assume that F (v) > 7δ and Sf+1 ≤ GST + ρ.
Then in single-shot HotStuff all correct processes decide by GST+ρ+
∑v+f−1
k=v−1(F (k) + δ) + 7δ.
We can also quantify the latency of the protocol under favorable conditions, when it is started
after GST. In this we rely on Property B, which gives conditions under which processes
synchronize in view 1. The following corollary of Theorem 5 exploits this property to bound
the latency of HotStuff when it is started after GST and the initial timeout is set appropriately,
but the protocol may still go through a sequence of up to f faulty leaders. The summation
in the bound (coming from Proposition 2) quantifies the overhead in the latter case.
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I Corollary 8. Assume that Sfirst ≥ GST and F (1) > 7δ. Then in single-shot HotStuff all
correct processes decide no later than Slast +
∑f
k=1(F (k) + δ) + 6δ.
Finally, the next corollary bounds the latency when additionally the leader of view 1 is
correct, in which case the protocol can benefit from the optimized execution of this view
noted earlier. The corollary follows from Property B and an easy strengthening of Theorem 5
for the special case of v = V = 1.
I Corollary 9. Assume that Sfirst ≥ GST, F (1) > 6δ, and leader(1) is correct. Then in
single-shot HotStuff all correct processes decide no later than Slast + 5δ.
4.2 Two-Phase HotStuff
We next consider a two-phase variant of HotStuff [40], which processes the leader’s proposals
in two phases instead of three. In exchange, it uses timeouts not just for view synchronization,
but also in the core consensus protocol to delimit different stages of a single view. This
demonstrates that our synchronizer specification is strong enough to deal with interactions
between the timeouts in different parts of the overall protocol. When used with our FastSync
synchronizer, the protocol furthermore requires only bounded space. Two-phase HotStuff is
similar to Tendermint [14] and Casper [15], which use timeouts for the same purposes. We
chose this protocol for conciseness of presentation, but in §B.5 we also present a variant of
the original Tendermint consensus based on our synchronizer (see §4.3).
Due to space constraints, we describe the changes to the protocol in Figure 3 required
to get its two-phase version informally and defer the pseudocode to §B.2. In two-phase
HotStuff, a process handles a proposal from the leader in the same way as in the three-phase
one, by sending a PREPARED message (line 11 in Figure 3). Upon assembling a quorum of
matching PREPARED messages (line 16), the process updates its variables as per lines 18-20,
but in addition immediately becomes locked on the prepared value prepared_val, without
exchanging PRECOMMITTED messages: the process assigns locked_view to the current view and
sends a COMMITTED message with the hash of the value. As before, assembling a quorum of
such messages causes the process to decide on the value (line 26). Upon entering a new view
(line 1), a process sends to the leader a NEWLEADER message with the information about the
last value it prepared (and therefore locked, line 4). The leader chooses its proposal in the
same way as in three-phase HotStuff (line 5).
The two-phase version of HotStuff is safe for the same reasons as the three-phase one:
the exchange of PRECOMMITTED messages, omitted from the current protocol, is only needed
for liveness, not safety. However, ensuring liveness in two-phase HotStuff requires a different
mechanism: since a correct process pi gets locked on a value immediately after preparing it,
gathering prepared values from an arbitrary quorum of processes is not enough for the leader
to ensure it will make a proposal that will pass the SafeProposal check at pi: the quorum may
well exclude this process. To solve this problem, the leader waits before making a proposal
so that eventually in some view it will receive NEWLEADER messages from all correct processes.
This ensures the leader will eventually make a proposal that will pass the SafeProposal checks
at all of them. In more detail, when a process enters a view where it is the leader, it sets
a special timer timer_newleader for the duration determined by a function Fp. The leader
makes a proposal by executing the handler in line 5 only after the timer expires.
For the leader to make an acceptable proposal, the duration of timer_newleader needs to
be long enough for all NEWLEADER messages for this view from correct processes to reach the
leader. For the protocol to decide, after timer_newleader expires, processes also need to stay
in the view long enough to complete the necessary message exchanges. The following theorem
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characterizes these requirements formally, again assuming d = 2δ in Property 4. Note that
in the proof of the theorem we rely on the guarantees about the timing of correct processes
entering a view (Property 4) to show that timer_newleader fulfills its intended function.
I Theorem 10. Let v ≥ V be a view such that Fp(v) > 3δ, F (v)−Fp(v) > 5δ and leader(v) is
correct. Then in two-phase HotStuff all correct processes decide at v by Elast(v) +Fp(v) + 3δ.
Proof. Once a correct process enters v, it sends its NEWLEADER message, so that leader(v)
is guaranteed to receive such messages from all correct processes by Elast(v) + δ. By
Property 4, the leader enters v by Elast(v) − 2δ at the earliest. Since the leader starts
its timer_newleader when it enters v and Fp(v) > 3δ, timer_newleader can only expire after
Elast(v) + δ. Thus, the leader is guaranteed to receive NEWLEADER messages from all correct
processes before timer_newleader expires. When timer_newleader expires, which happens
no later than Elast(v) + Fp(v), the leader will send its proposal in a PROPOSE message,
which correct processes will receive by Elast(v) + Fp(v) + δ. If they deem the proposal
safe, it takes them at most 2δ to exchange the sequence of PREPARED and COMMITTED
messages leading to decisions. By (2), all correct processes will stay in v until at least
Elast(v) + (F (v) − d) > Efirst(v) + Fp(v) + 3δ. By then the above sequence of message
exchanges will complete, and all correct processes will decide.
It remains to show that the proposal leader(v) makes in view v will satisfy SafeProposal
at all correct processes. It is easy to show that this proposal is valid, so we now need to prove
the last conjunct of SafeProposal. This trivially holds if no correct process is locked on a
value when receiving the PROPOSE message from the leader. We now consider the case when
some correct process is locked on a value when receiving the PROPOSE message, and let pi be
a process that is locked on the highest view among correct processes. Let x = pi.prepared_val
be the value locked and v0 = pi.locked_view < v be the corresponding view. Since leader(v)
receives all of the NEWLEADER messages sent by correct processes before making its proposal, it
proposes a value x′ with a prepared certificate formed at some view v′ ≥ v0. Also, if v′ = v0,
then by Proposition 3, x′ = x and x is the only value that can be locked by a correct process
at v0. Hence, the leader’s proposal will satisfy SafeProposal at each correct process. uunionsq
Since leaders rotate round-robin, Theorem 10 implies that the protocol is live, provided
the functions F and Fp, as well as the difference between them, grow without bound. This
can be satisfied, e.g., by letting F (v) = 2v and Fp(v) = v.
I Corollary 11. Let F and Fp be such that (1) holds and ∀θ.∃v.∀v′. v′ ≥ v =⇒ F (v′) −
Fp(v′) > θ. Then in two-phase HotStuff all correct processes eventually decide.
Protocol latency. Similarly to §4.1, when the protocol is used with the FastSync synchro-
nizer, we can quantify its latency in both unfavorable scenarios (when starting before GST)
and favorable scenarios (when starting after GST). The first corollary of Theorem 10 below
uses Property C and Proposition 2, and the following two corollaries, Property B.
I Corollary 12. Let v = GV(GST + ρ) + 1 and assume that Sf+1 ≤ GST + ρ, Fp(v) > 3δ
and F (v)−Fp(v) > 5δ. Then in two-phase HotStuff all correct processes decide no later than
GST + ρ+
∑v+f−1
k=v−1(F (k) + δ) + Fp(v + f) + 5δ.
I Corollary 13. Assume that Sfirst ≥ GST, Fp(1) > 3δ and F (1)−Fp(1) > 5δ. Then in two-
phase HotStuff all correct processes decide no later than Slast+
∑f
k=1(F (k)+δ)+Fp(f+1)+4δ.
I Corollary 14. Assume that Sfirst ≥ GST, F (1) > 5δ and leader(1) is correct. Then in
two-phase HotStuff all correct processes decide no later than Slast + 4δ.
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Like in §4.1, the last corollary takes into account the optimized execution of view 1. The
above latency bounds allow us to compare the two-phase and three-phase versions of HotStuff
(§4.1). In the ideal case when the timeouts are set optimally and the leader of view 1 is
correct, two-phase HotStuff has a lower latency than three-phase one: 4δ in Corollary 14
vs 5δ in Corollary 9. When the initial leader is faulty, both protocols incur the overhead of
switching through several views until they encounter a correct leader (Corollaries 13 and 8).
In this case, the latency of deciding in the first view with a correct leader is at most 6δ for
three-phase HotStuff and Fp(f+1)+4δ for two-phase one. Even when Fp(f+1) is the optimal
3δ, the two-phase HotStuff bound yields 7δ – a higher latency than for three-phase HotStuff.
The latency bounds for the case of starting before GST relate similarly (Corollaries 12 and 7).
The higher latency of two-phase HotStuff in these cases are caused by the inclusion of the
timeout Fp(f + 1), which reflects the lack of “optimistic responsiveness” of this protocol [40].
4.3 Single-Shot PBFT, SBFT and Tendermint
Using our synchronizer specification, we have also proved the correctness and analyzed
the latency of single-shot versions of PBFT [19], SBFT [30] and Tendermint [14], thus
demonstrating the wide applicability of the specification. Due to space constraints we defer
the details to §B. Our analysis of PBFT is similar to that of HotStuff. SBFT is a recent
improvement of PBFT that adds a fast path for cases when all processes are correct, and
our analysis quantifies the latency of both paths.
Tendermint is similar to two-phase HotStuff; in particular, it also uses timeouts both for
view synchronization and to delimit different stages of a single view. However, the protocol
never sends messages with certificates, and thus, like FastSync, does not need digital
signatures. Tendermint integrates the functionality required for view synchronization with
the core consensus protocol, breaking its control flow in multiple places. We consider its
variant that delegates this functionality to the synchronizer, thus simplifying the protocol.
Our analysis of the resulting protocol is similar to the one of two-phase HotStuff in §4.2.
Apart from deriving latency bounds for the protocol, our analysis exploits the synchronizer
specification to give a proof of its liveness that is more rigorous than the existing ones [8, 14],
which lacked a detailed correctness argument for the view synchronization mechanism used
in the protocol.
5 Related Work
Most Byzantine consensus protocols are based on the concept of views (aka rounds), and
thus include a mechanism for view synchronization. This mechanism is typically integrated
with the core consensus protocol, which complicates the design [14, 19, 30]. Subtle view
synchronization mechanisms have often come without a proof of liveness (e.g., PBFT [18]) or
had liveness bugs (e.g., Tendermint [7] and Casper [1]). Furthermore, liveness proofs have not
usually given concrete bounds on the latency of reaching a decision (exceptions are [6, 35]).
Several papers suggested separating the functionality of view synchronization into a
distinct component, starting with the seminal DLS paper on consensus under partial syn-
chrony [26]. DLS specified the guarantees provided by view synchronization indirectly, by
proving that its implementation simulated an abstract computational model with a built-in
notion of rounds. Unlike us, DLS did not give a specification determining how long processes
stay in a round and how quickly they switch between rounds; as we have demonstrated,
such properties are needed to reason about modern Byzantine consensus protocols. DLS
implemented rounds using a distributed protocol that synchronizes process-local clocks
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obtained by counting state transitions of each process. This protocol has to synchronize local
clocks on every step of the consensus algorithm, which results in prohibitive communication
overheads and makes this solution impractical.
Abraham et al. [3] build upon ideas from fault-tolerant clock synchronization [24, 39] to
implement view synchronization assuming that processes have access to hardware clocks with
bounded drift. But this work only gives a solution for a synchronous system. Our FastSync
synchronizer also assumes hardware clocks but removes the assumption of bounded drift
before GST, thus making them compatible with partial synchrony. We note that, although
the problems of clock and view synchronization are different, they are closely related at the
algorithmic level. We therefore believe that our view synchronization techniques can in the
future be adapted to obtain an efficient partially synchronous clock synchronization protocol.
The HotStuff protocol [40] delegated the functionality of view synchronization to a
separate component, called a pacemaker. But it did not provide a formal specification of
this component or a practical implementation. To address this, Naor et al. have recently
formalized view synchronization as a separate problem [37, 38]. Unlike us, they did not
provide a comprehensive study of the applicability of their specifications to a wide range
of modern Byzantine consensus protocols. In particular, their specifications do not expose
bounds on how quickly processes switch views (Property 4 in Figure 1), which are necessary
for protocols such as two-phase HotStuff (§4.2) and Tendermint (§4.3).
Naor et al. also proposed synchronizer implementations in a simplified variant of partial
synchrony where δ is known a priori, and messages sent before GST are guaranteed to arrive
by GST + δ [37, 38]. These implementations focus on optimizing communication complexity,
making it linear in best-case scenarios [37] or in expectation [38]. They achieve linearity by
relying on digital signatures (more precisely, threshold signatures), which FastSync eschews.
Unlike FastSync, they also require unbounded space (for the reasons explained in §3.1).
Finally, we give exact latency bounds for FastSync under both favorable and unfavorable
conditions whereas [37, 38] only provide expected latency analysis. It is interesting to
investigate whether the benefits of the two approaches can be combined to tolerate message
loss before GST with both bounded space and a low communication complexity.
LibraBFT [2] extends HotStuff with a view synchronization mechanism, integrated with
the core protocol; the protocol assumes reliable channels. LibraBFT is optimized to solve
repeated consensus, whereas in this paper we focus on single-shot one. We leave investigating
synchronizer abstractions optimized for the multi-shot case to future work.
The original idea of using synchronizers to simulate a round-based synchronous system
on top of an asynchronous one is due to Awerbuch [10]. This work however, did not consider
failures. Augmented round models to systematically study properties of distributed consensus
under various failure and environment assumptions were proposed in [12, 22, 28, 32]. These
papers however, do not deal with implementing the proposed models under partial synchrony.
Upper bounds for deciding after GST in round-based crash fault-tolerant consensus algorithms
were studied in [5, 25]. While we derive similar bounds for Byzantine failures, it remains open
if these are optimal or can be further improved. Failure detectors [20, 21], which abstract
away the timeliness guarantees of the environment, have been extensively used for developing
and analyzing consensus algorithms [21, 36] in the presence of benign failures. However, since
capturing all possible faulty behaviors is algorithm-specific, the classical notion of a failure
detector does not naturally generalize to Byzantine settings. As a result, the existing work
on Byzantine failure detectors either limits the types of failures being addressed (e.g., [34]),
or focuses on other means (such as accountability [31]) to mitigate faulty behavior.
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A Correctness of the Synchronizer Algorithm
The local view of a process pi at time t, denoted LVi(t), is the latest view entered by pi
at or before t, or 0 if pi has not entered any views by then. Thus, GV(t) = max{LVi(t) |
pi is correct}. We say that a process pi attempts to advance from a view v ≥ 0 at time t if
at this time pi executes the code in either line 3 or line 5, and LVi(t) = v.
I Lemma 15. For all times t and views v > 0, if a correct process sends WISH(v) at t, then
there exists a time t′ ≤ t such that some correct process attempts to advance from v− 1 at t′.
Proof. We first prove the following auxiliary proposition:
∀pi.∀v. pi is correct ∧ pi sends WISH(v) at t =⇒
∃t′ ≤ t.∃v′ ≥ v − 1.∃pj . pj is correct ∧ pj attempts to advance from v′ at t′. (3)
By contradiction, assume that a correct process pi sends WISH(v) at t, but for all t′ ≤ t and
all v′ ≥ v − 1, no correct process attempts to advance from v′ at t′. Consider the earliest
time tk when some correct process pk sends a WISH(vk) with vk ≥ v, so that tk ≤ t. Since at
tk process pk does not attempt to advance from vk, it has to execute the code in either one
of the following lines: 5, 8, 10, or 21.
Since pk sends WISH(vk) at tk, then either vk = pk.view+(tk) or pk.view(tk) =
pk.view+(tk) = vk − 1, and in the latter case pk executes either line 5 or line 10. If
pk.view+(tk) = vk ≥ v, then pk.max_views(tk) includes f + 1 entries ≥ vk ≥ v, and there-
fore, there exists a correct process pl that sent WISH(v′) with v′ ≥ v at tl < tk, contra-
dicting the assumption that tk is the earliest time when this can happen. Suppose that
pk.view(tk) = pk.view+(tk) = vk − 1 and at tk, pk executes either line 5 or line 10. Then
LVk(tk) = vk − 1. If pk executes line 5 at tk, then since LVk(tk) = vk − 1, pk attempts to
advance from vk − 1 ≥ v − 1 at tk ≤ t, contradicting our assumption that no such attempt
can occur.
Suppose now that pk executes the code in line 10 at tk and pk.view(tk) = pk.view+(tk) =
vk − 1. Consider first the case when vk = 1. Since max_views[k] > 0, pk has already sent
WISH(v′k) for some view v′k ≥ 1 at time sk < tk. Since v′k ≥ vk ≥ v, this is a contradiction
to our assumption that no WISH messages with views ≥ v can be sent before tk. It remains
to consider the case when vk > 1. Then Ek(vk − 1) is defined and satisfies Ek(vk − 1) < tk.
Thus, pk.view(Ek(vk − 1)) = pk.view+(Ek(vk − 1)) = vk − 1. Since pk starts pk.timer_view
at Ek(vk − 1), and pk.timer_view(tk) is not enabled, there exists a time Ek(vk − 1) < t′k < tk
such that pk.timer_view expires at t′k, triggering the execution of the timer_view expiration
handler. Since both pk.view and pk.view+ are non-decreasing, and both are equal to vk − 1
at Ek(vk − 1) as well as tk, pk.view(t′k) = pk.view+(t′k) = vk − 1. Thus, LVk(t′k) = vk − 1,
which implies that at t′k < tk ≤ t, pk attempts to advance from vk − 1 ≥ v − 1, contradicting
our assumption that no such attempt can happen. We conclude that (3) holds.
We now prove the lemma. Let t be a time and v be a view such that some correct process
sends WISH(v) at t. By (3), there exists a correct process that attempts to advance from a
view ≥ v − 1 at or before t. Let t′ be the earliest time when some correct process attempts
to advance from a view ≥ v − 1, and let pj be this process and v′ ≥ v − 1 be the view
from which pj attempts to advance at t′. Thus, at t′, pj executes the code in either line 3
or line 5, and LVj(t′) = v′ ≥ v − 1. Suppose first that pj executes the code in line 5 at
t′. Since LVj(t′) = v′, there exists an earlier time at which pj .view+ = pj .view = v′. Since
pj .view+ is non-decreasing, pj .view+(t′) ≥ v′. If pj .view+(t′) > v′, then given that v′ ≥ v− 1,
pj .view+(t′) ≥ v. Thus, there exists a correct process pk and time t′′ < t′ such that pk sent
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WISH(v′′) with v′′ ≥ v to pj at t′′. By (3), there exists a time ≤ t′′ < t′ at which some
correct process attempts to advance from a view ≥ v′′ − 1 ≥ v − 1, which is impossible.
Thus, pj .view+(t′) = v′. Since LVj(t′) = v′, we have pj .view(t′) = pj .view+(t′) = v′. Suppose
now that pj executes the code in line 3. Then pj .view+(t′) = pj .view(t′) = 0 = LVj(t′) = v′.
Hence, in both cases
pj .view(t′) = pj .view+(t′) = v′ ≥ v − 1.
By the definitions of view and view+, v′ is both the lowest view among the highest 2f+1 views
in pj .max_views(t′), and the lowest view among the highest f + 1 views in pj .max_views(t′).
Hence, pj .max_views(t′) includes f +1 entries equal to v′, and therefore, there exists a correct
process pk such that
pj .view(t′) = pj .view+(t′) = pj .max_views[k](t′) = v′ ≥ v − 1. (4)
Also, for all correct processes pl, pj .max_views[l](t′) < v for otherwise, some correct process
sent WISH(v′′) with v′′ ≥ v at t′′ < t′, and therefore, by (3), some correct process attempted
to advance from a view ≥ v − 1 earlier than t′, which is impossible. Thus,
pj .view(t′) = pj .view+(t′) = pj .max_views[k](t′) < v.
Together with (4), this implies
pj .view(t′) = pj .view+(t′) = v − 1.
Hence, LVj(t′) = v−1, and therefore, pj attempts to advance from v−1 at t′. Thus, v′ = v−1
and t′ ≤ t, as required. uunionsq
I Lemma 16. If a correct process pi enters a view v, then there exists a time t < Ei(v) at
which some correct process attempts to advance from v − 1.
Proof. Since pi enters a view v, we have pi.view(Ei(v)) = pi.view+(Ei(v)) = v. By
the definitions of view and view+, v is both the lowest view among the highest 2f + 1
views in pi.max_views(Ei(v)), and the lowest view among the highest f + 1 views in
pi.max_views(Ei(v)). Hence, pi.max_views(Ei(v)) includes f + 1 entries equal to v. Then
there exists a time t′ < Ei(v) at which some correct process sends WISH(v). Hence, by
Lemma 15, there exists a time t ≤ t′ < Ei(v) at which some correct process attempts to
advance from v − 1. uunionsq
I Lemma 17. For all times t and views v > 0, if a correct process sends WISH(v) at t, then
there exists a time t′ ≤ t such that some correct process calls start at t′.
Proof. Consider the earliest time tk ≤ t at which some correct process pk sends WISH(vk)
for some view vk. By Lemma 15, there exists a time tj ≤ tk at which some correct process
attempts to advance from vk − 1 ≥ 0, and therefore, sends WISH(vk) at tj . Since tk is the
earliest time when this could happen, we have tj = tk. Also, if vk − 1 > 0, then Ek(vk − 1) is
defined, and hence, by Lemma 16, some correct process attempts to advance from vk − 2 by
sending WISH(vk − 1) earlier than tj = tk, which cannot happen. Thus, at tk, pk attempts to
advance from view 0, so that vk = 1 and LVk(tk) = 0. Assume first that pk executes the code
in line 5 at tk. Then pk.timer_view expires at tk, and hence, there exists a time sk < tk such
that pk.timer_view is set at sk. Thus, at sk, pk enters a view > 0. Since LV is non-decreasing,
LVk(tk) > 0, which is a contradiction. Thus, pk cannot execute line 5 at tk, and has to call
start at this time. uunionsq
I Lemma 18. Global view never skips values: ∀t.GV(t) > 0 =⇒ ∃t′ < t.GV(t′) = GV(t)− 1.
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Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exists time t such that
GV(t) > 0 ∧ ∀t′ < t.GV(t) 6= GV(t′) + 1.
Since GV is non-decreasing, the above implies
GV(t) > 0 ∧ ∀t′ < t.GV(t) > GV(t′) + 1. (5)
Since GV(0) = 0, (5) implies that t > 0 and GV(t) > 1. By the definition of GV, there
exists a correct process pi such that Ei(GV(t)) ≤ t. Then by Lemma 16, there exist a
time t′ < t at which some correct process pj attempted to advance from GV(t)− 1. Thus,
LVj(t′) = GV(t) − 1, which by the definition of GV, implies GV(t′) ≥ LVj(t′) = GV(t) − 1.
Hence, GV(t) ≤ GV(t′) + 1, which is a contradiction to (5). uunionsq
I Lemma 19. For all views v, if a correct process enters v, then GV(Efirst(v)) = v.
Proof. By the definition of GV, GV(Efirst(v)) ≥ v. If GV(Efirst(v)) > v, then there exists
a view v′ > v, and a time t′ < Efirst(v) such that some correct process enters v′ at time t′.
Thus, GV(t′) ≥ v′ > v. By Lemma 18, there exists a time t′′ < t′, such that GV(t′′) = v,
and therefore, Efirst(v) ≤ t′′ < t′ < Efirst(v), which is a contradiction. We conclude that
GV(Efirst(v)) = v, as needed. uunionsq
I Corollary 20. For all views v, v′ > 0 such that v ≤ v′, if some correct processes enter v
and v′, then Efirst(v) ≤ Efirst(v′).
Proof. By Lemma 19, v < v′ implies that GV(Efirst(v)) ≤ GV(Efirst(v′)). Since GV is
non-decreasing, Efirst(v) ≤ Efirst(v′), as needed. uunionsq
I Lemma 21. If a correct process pi sends WISH(v) at t and WISH(v′) at t′ ≥ t, then v′ ≥ v.
Proof. We first state three simple facts that follow directly from the structure of the code.
First, for all times t, if a correct process pi sends WISH(v) with v > pi.view+(t) by executing
the code in lines 3, 5 or 10 at t, and v = pi.view(t) + 1 > pi.view+(t), then given that
pi.view(t) ≤ pi.view+(t), we have
∀t. ∀v. (pi sends WISH(v) in lines 3, 5, or 10 at t) =⇒
(pi.view+(t) ≤ v − 1 ⇐⇒ v = pi.view(t) + 1 ⇐⇒ pi.view(t) = pi.view+(t)). (6)
Also, since pi never sends a WISH message with a view < view+, we have
∀t. ∀v. (pi sends WISH(v) at t) =⇒ v ≥ pi.view+(t). (7)
Finally, since a view sent in a WISH message is equal to view+ when either timer_view is
enabled or line 21 is executed, we have
∀t. ∀v. (pi sends WISH(v) at t) ∧ ((pi.timer_view(t) is enabled) ∨ (pi executes line 21))
=⇒ v = pi.view+(t). (8)
We now prove the lemma. Suppose that at t, a correct process pi sends WISH(v), and consider
a time t′ > t such that pi sends WISH(v′) at t′. We consider two cases:
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pi.view+(t) ≤ v − 1. Then v ≥ pi.view+(t) + 1 > pi.view+(t), and hence, by (8),
pi.timer_view(t) is disabled and pi does not execute the code in line 21 at t. Thus,
at t, pi executes the code in lines 3, 5, or 10, which by (6), implies
pi.view(t) = pi.view+(t) ∧ v = pi.view(t) + 1.
Since pi.view+ is non-decreasing, pi.view+(t′) ≥ pi.view+(t). If pi.view+(t′) = pi.view+(t),
then pi does not execute the code in line 21 at t. Also, since pi.view is non-decreasing and
pi.view(t′) ≤ pi.view+(t′), we have pi.view(t′) = pi.view+(t′) and pi.view(t) = pi.view(t′).
Then since pi.timer_view(t) is disabled, pi.timer_view(t′) is disabled as well. Hence, at t′
the process pi executes the code in lines 3, 5, or 10, which by (6) implies v′ = pi.view(t′) +
1 = pi.view(t) + 1 = v, as needed. On the other hand, if pi.view+(t) < pi.view+(t′), then
by (7),
v′ ≥ pi.view+(t′) > pi.view+(t).
Hence,
v′ ≥ pi.view+(t′) ≥ pi.view+(t) + 1 = pi.view(t) + 1 = v,
as needed.
pi.view+(t) > v − 1. Then pi.view+(t) ≥ v. Since by (7), v′ ≥ pi.view+(t′) and pi.view+
is non-decreasing, we have v′ ≥ pi.view+(t′) ≥ pi.view+(t) ≥ v, as needed.
uunionsq
I Lemma 22. If a correct process enters a view v > 0 and Efirst(v) ≥ GST, then for all
v′ > v, no correct process attempts to advance from v′ − 1 before Efirst(v) + F (v).
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a time t′ < Efirst(v) +F (v) and a correct
process pi such that pi attempts to advance from v′ − 1 > v− 1 at t′. If pi executes the code
in line 3 at t′, then LVi(t′) = 0 = v′ − 1 > v − 1 ≥ 0, which is impossible. Thus, at t′, the
process pi executes the code in line 5, and LVi(t′) = v′− 1. Since pi.timer_view is not enabled
at t′, pi must have entered v′ − 1 at least F (v) before t′ according to its local clock. Since
v′ − 1 ≥ v, by Corollary 20, we have Efirst(v′ − 1) ≥ Efirst(v) ≥ GST. Therefore, given that
the clocks of all correct processes progress at the same rate as real time after GST, we get
Efirst(v) ≤ Efirst(v′ − 1) ≤ t′ − F (v′ − 1).
Hence,
t′ ≥ Efirst(v) + F (v′ − 1).
Since F is non-decreasing and v′ − 1 ≥ v, we have F (v′ − 1) ≥ F (v) and
t′ ≥ Efirst(v) + F (v′ − 1) ≥ Efirst(v) + F (v),
which contradicts our assumption that t′ < Efirst(v) + F (v). Thus, no correct process can
attempt to advance from v′ − 1 before Efirst(v) + F (v), as needed. uunionsq
I Corollary 23. Assume a correct process enters a view v > 0 and Efirst(v) ≥ GST. For all
views v′ > v, if there exists a correct process that enters v′, then Efirst(v′) > Efirst(v) + F (v).
Proof. Since a correct process enters a view v′ > 0, by Lemma 16, there exist a time
t < Efirst(v′) at which some correct process attempts to advance from v′ − 1. By Lemma 22,
we get t ≥ Efirst(v) + F (v), so that Efirst(v′) > t ≥ Efirst(v) + F (v), as required. uunionsq
I Corollary 24. Consider a view v and assume that v is entered by a correct process. If
Efirst(v) ≥ GST, then a correct process cannot send a WISH(v′) with v′ > v earlier than
Efirst(v) + F (v).
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Proof. Assume a correct process sends a WISH(v′) with v′ > v at time t′. By Lemma 15, there
exists a time s ≤ t′ such that some correct process pi attempts to advance from v′− 1 > v− 1
at s. By Lemma 22, s ≥ Efirst(v) + F (v), which implies that t′ ≥ s ≥ Efirst(v) + F (v), as
required. uunionsq
For an arbitrary time t, we let postGST(t) be a predicate defined as follows:
postGST(t) ⇐⇒ (∀pi.∀v > 0. pi is correct =⇒
(∃s ≤ t. pi sends WISH(v) at s =⇒ ∃t′.∃v′ ≥ v. pi sends WISH(v′) at t′ ∧ GST ≤ t′ ≤ t)).
I Lemma 25. Sfirst ≥ GST =⇒ ∀t ≥ Sfirst. postGST(t).
Proof. Let t ≥ Sfirst, and consider a correct process pi and view v such that pi sends WISH(v)
at time s ≤ t. By Lemma 17, no correct process can send a WISH message before Sfirst, and
therefore, s ≥ Sfirst ≥ GST. Thus, t′ = s and v′ = v satisfy pi sends WISH(v′) at t′ ∧ GST ≤
t′ ≤ t ∧ v′ ≥ v, as needed. uunionsq
I Lemma 26. ∀t ≥ GST + ρ. postGST(t).
Proof. Let t ≥ GST + ρ, and consider a correct process pi and a view v such that pi
sends WISH(v) at s ≤ t. If s ≥ GST, then choosing t′ = s and v′ = v validates postGST.
Suppose that s < GST. Since after GST the local clock of pi advances at the same rate
as real time, there exists a time ti satisfying GST ≤ ti ≤ t such that pi executes the
periodic retransmission code in lines 6-10 at ti. Since pi already sent a WISH message at
s < GST ≤ ti, and every message sent by a correct process is instantaneously received by the
sender, pi.max_views[i](ti) > 0, and therefore, the code sending WISH(v′) for some view v′ is
guaranteed to be reached at ti. Since ti > s, by Lemma 21, v′ ≥ v. Thus, choosing t′ = ti
validates postGST. Hence, we get that for all values of s ≤ t, we can find a time t′ and a
view v′ validating postGST, which implies the result. uunionsq
I Lemma 27. Let t ≥ GST be a time such that postGST(t) holds. Then for all times t′ ≥ t
and views v, if a correct process pi sends WISH(v) at a time s < t′, then pi also sends WISH(v′)
with some v′ ≥ v at a time s′ such that GST ≤ s′ ≤ t′.
Proof. If t ≤ s < t′, then since t ≥ GST, we have GST ≤ s′ < t′. Thus, choosing s′ = s
validates the lemma. On the other hand, if s < t, then since postGST(t) holds, there exists a
time s′ such that GST ≤ s′ ≤ t ≤ t′ and pi sends WISH(v′) with v′ ≥ v at s′. Thus, s′ chosen
in this way satisfies the required. uunionsq
I Lemma 28. For all v, if some correct process enters v, and
(i) Efirst(v) ≥ GST,
(ii) postGST(Efirst(v)) holds, and
(iii) F (v) > 2δ,
then all correct processes enter v and Elast(v) ≤ Efirst(v) + 2δ.
Proof. Since Efirst(v) ≥ GST and F (v) > 2δ, by Corollary 24, we have:
(iv) no correct process sends WISH(v′) with v′ > v until after Efirst(v) + 2δ.
Let pi be a correct process that enters v at Efirst(v). By the view entry condition,
pl.view(Efirst(v)) = v, and therefore pi.max_views(Efirst(v)) includes 2f + 1 entries ≥ v. At
least f + 1 of these entries belong to correct processes, and by (iv), none of them can be > v.
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Hence, there exists a set C of f + 1 correct processes, each of which sends WISH(v) to all
processes before Efirst(v).
Since postGST(Efirst(v)) holds, any pj ∈ C also sends a message WISH(v′) with v′ ≥ v at
some time t′j such that GST ≤ t′j < Efirst(v). Then by (iv) we have v′ = v. It follows that
each pj ∈ C is guaranteed to send a copy of WISH(v) to all correct processes between GST
and Efirst(v). Since all messages sent by correct processes after GST are guaranteed to be
received by all correct processes within δ of their transmission, by Efirst(v) + δ all correct
processes will receive WISH(v) from at least f + 1 distinct correct processes.
Consider an arbitrary correct process pj and let tj ≤ Efirst(v) + δ be the earliest time
by which pj receives WISH(v) from f + 1 correct processes. By (iv), no correct process
sends WISH(v′) with v′ > v before tj < Efirst(v) + 2δ. Thus, pj .max_views(tj) includes at
least f + 1 entries equal to v and at most f entries > v, so that pj .view+(tj) = v. If
pj .prev_v+(tj) < v, then at tj the process pj sends WISH(v) to all processes by executing
the code in line 21. Otherwise, pj must have already sent WISH(v) to all processes at some
time before tj ≤ Efirst(v) + δ. Thus, in both cases pj sends WISH(v) with to all processes
no later than Efirst(v) + δ. Since postGST(Efirst(v)) holds and Efirst(v) ≥ GST, by (iv) and
Lemma 27, pj also sends WISH(v) to all processes sometime between GST and Efirst(v) + δ.
Hence, all correct processes are guaranteed to send WISH(v) to all correct processes between
GST and Efirst(v) + δ.
Consider an arbitrary correct process pk and let tk ≤ Efirst(v) + 2δ be the earliest time
by which pk receives WISH(v) from all correct processes. Then by (iv), at tk the array
pk.max_views will contain include at least 2f + 1 entries equal to v, and at most f entries
greater than v. Therefore, pk.view(tk) = pk.view+(tk) = v, so that pk enters v no later than
tk ≤ Efirst(v) + 2δ. We have thus shown that by Efirst(v) + 2δ, all correct processes will enter
v, as required. uunionsq
Since by Lemma 26, postGST(t) holds for all t > GST + ρ, from Lemma 28 we get
I Corollary 29. For all views v, if a correct process enters v, Efirst(v) > GST + ρ, and
F (v) > 2δ, then all correct processes enter v and Elast(v) ≤ Efirst(v) + 2δ.
I Lemma 30. Let t ≥ GST be a time such that postGST(t) holds, and T ≥ t be a time such
that:
(i) no correct process sends WISH(v) with v > GV(t) + 1 before T + 2δ; and
(ii) there exists a time s ≤ T + δ such that all correct processes send WISH(GV(t) + 1) to all
processes no later than at s.
Then all correct processes enter GV(t) + 1 and Elast(GV(t) + 1) ≤ s+ δ.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary correct process pi that sends WISH(GV(t) + 1) to all processes at
time ti ≤ s ≤ T + δ, as stipulated by (ii). Since t ≥ GST, postGST(t), and T + δ ≥ t, by
Lemma 27 and (i) there exists a time t′i such that GST ≤ t′i ≤ s and at t′i the process pi sends
WISH(GV(t)+1) to all processes. Since t′i ≥ GST, all correct processes receive WISH(GV(t)+1)
from all correct processes no later than at t′i + δ ≤ s+ δ.
Consider an arbitrary correct process pj and let tj ≤ s+ δ ≤ T + 2δ be the earliest time
by which pj receives receives WISH(GV(t) + 1) from all correct processes. Thus, at tj , the
entries of all correct processes in pj .max_views are occupied by views ≥ GV(t) + 1. By (i)
none of the entries in pj .max_views(tj) belonging to correct processes are occupied by views
> GV(t)+1. Thus, each such entry in pj .max_views(tj) stores GV(t)+1. Since at least 2f +1
entries in pj .max_views belong to correct processes, pj .view(tj) = pj .view+(tj) = GV(t) + 1.
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Therefore, pj enters GV(t) + 1 no later than tj ≤ s+ δ. Thus, we conclude that all correct
processes enter GV(t) + 1 and Elast(GV(t) + 1) ≤ s+ δ, as needed. uunionsq
I Lemma 31. Let t ≥ GST be a time such that postGST(t) holds, t1 = max(Sf+1, t),
t2 = max(Slast, t), and T = max(min(t1, t2 − δ), t). Assume that
(i) GV(t) = 0, and
(ii) no correct process can send WISH(v) with v > 1 before T + 2δ.
Then all correct processes enter view 1 and Elast(1) ≤ min(t1 + 2δ, t2 + δ).
Proof. We consider three cases:
t ≤ Sf+1 ≤ Slast, i.e., t1 = Sf+1 and t2 = Slast. Hence T = max(min(Sf+1, Slast − δ), t).
We consider two cases:
Sf+1 + δ < Slast. Hence, Sf+1 < Slast − δ, and therefore,
T = max(Sf+1, t) = Sf+1. (9)
Let C be the set of the f + 1 correct processes pi calling start() at ti ≤ Sf+1. If
pi.view+(ti) = 0, then at ti, pi sends WISH(1) to all processes by executing the code in
line 3. Otherwise, by (9) and (ii), pi.view+(ti) = 1, and pi sent WISH(1) when pi.view+
first became equal to 1 at some time si < ti ≤ Sf+1. Since ti ≤ Sf+1, in both cases,
by Lemma 27, pi sends WISH(v) with v ≥ 1 sometime between GST and Sf+1. By (9)
and (ii), we have v = 1. Thus, we get that all processes in C send WISH(1) to all
processes in-between GST and Sf+1. It follows that all correct processes receive all
these WISH(1) messages no later than Sf+1 + δ. Consider a correct process pj , and let
GST ≤ tj ≤ Sf+1+δ be the earliest time by which pj receives the WISH(1) messages sent
by the processes in C in-between GST and Sf+1. By (9) and (ii), pj .max_views[k] = 1
for all pk ∈ C, and there are at most f entries in pj .max_views(tj) occupied by views
> 1. Thus, pj .view+(tj) = 1. If pj .view+(tj) > pj .prev_v+(tj), then pj sends WISH(1)
to all processes at tj ≥ GST by executing the code in line 21. Otherwise, pj sent
WISH(1) when pj .view+ first became equal to 1 sometime before tj . Thus, we get that
pj sends WISH(1) to all processes no later than Sf+1 + δ ≤ T + δ. By Lemma 30, all
correct processes enter view 1, and Elast(1) ≤ Sf+1 + 2δ = t1 + 2δ. Since t1 + δ < t2,
we also have Elast(1) ≤ min(t1 + 2δ, t2 + δ), as needed.
Sf+1 + δ ≥ Slast. Hence, Sf+1 ≥ Slast − δ, and therefore,
T = max(min(Sf+1, Slast − δ), t) = max(Slast − δ, t).
Hence,
T + 2δ ≥ Slast + δ (10)
and
Slast ≤ T + δ. (11)
Let pi be a correct process calling start() at ti ≤ Slast. If pi.view+(ti) = 0, then
at ti, pi sends WISH(1) to all processes by executing the code in line 3. Otherwise,
by (10) and (ii), pi.view+(ti) = 1, and pi sent WISH(1) when pi.view+ first became
equal to 1 at some time si < ti ≤ Slast. Since by (11), Slast ≤ T + δ, we have that all
correct processes send WISH(1) to all processes no later than Slast ≤ T + δ. Thus, by
Lemma 30, all correct processes enter view 1, and Elast(1) ≤ Slast + δ = t2 + δ. Since
t1 + δ ≥ t2, we also have Elast(1) ≤ min(t1 + 2δ, t2 + δ), as needed.
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Sf+1 < t ≤ Slast. Hence, t1 = t and t2 = Slast, and therefore, T = max(min(t, Slast−δ), t).
We consider two cases:
t+ δ < Slast. Hence, t < Slast − δ, and therefore
T = t. (12)
Let C be the set of the f + 1 correct processes pi calling start() at ti < t. If
pi.view+(ti) = 0, then at ti, pi sends WISH(1) to all processes by executing the code in
line 3. Otherwise, by (12) and (ii), pi.view+(ti) = 1, and pi sent WISH(1) when pi.view+
first became equal to 1 at sometime before ti. Since ti < t, and postGST(t) holds, there
exists a time si such that GST ≤ si < t and at si, pi sends WISH(v) with v ≥ 1 to all
processes. By (12) and (ii), we have v = 1. Thus, we get that all processes in C send
WISH(1) to all processes in-between GST and t. It follows that all correct processes
receive all these WISH(1) messages no later than t+ δ. Consider a correct process pj ,
and let GST ≤ tj ≤ t+δ be the earliest time by which pj receives the WISH(1) messages
sent by the processes in C in-between GST and t. By (12) and (ii), pj .max_views[k] = 1
for all pk ∈ C, and there are at most f entries in pj .max_views(tj) occupied by views
> 1. Thus, pj .view+(tj) = 1. If pj .view+(tj) > pj .prev_v+(tj), then pj sends WISH(1)
to all processes at tj ≥ GST by executing the code in line 21. Otherwise, pj sent
WISH(1) when pj .view+ first became equal to 1 sometime before tj . Since t+ δ ≥ tj ,
by Thus, we get that pj sends WISH(1) to all processes no later than t + δ ≤ T + δ.
From Lemma 30, all correct processes enter view 1 and Elast(1) ≤ t + 2δ = t1 + 2δ.
Since t1 + δ < t2, we also have Elast(1) ≤ min(t1 + 2δ, t2 + δ), as needed.
t+ δ ≥ Slast. Hence, t ≥ Slast − δ, and therefore
T = max(min(t, Slast − δ), t) = max(Slast − δ, t).
Hence,
T + 2δ ≥ Slast + δ (13)
and
Slast ≤ T + δ. (14)
Let pi be a correct process calling start() at ti ≤ Slast. If pi.view+(ti) = 0, then
at ti, pi sends WISH(1) to all processes by executing the code in line 3. Otherwise,
by (13) and (ii), pi.view+(ti) = 1, and pi sent WISH(1) when pi.view+ first became
equal to 1 at some time si < ti ≤ Slast. Since by (14), Slast ≤ T + δ, we have that all
correct processes send WISH(1) to all processes no later than Slast ≤ T + δ. Thus, by
Lemma 30, all correct processes enter view 1, and Elast(1) ≤ Slast + δ = t2 + δ. Since
t2 ≤ t1 + δ, we also have Elast(1) ≤ min(t1 + 2δ, t2 + δ), as needed.
Sf+1 ≤ Slast < t. Hence, t1 = t2 = t, and therefore,
T = max(min(t1, t2 − δ), t) = t. (15)
Let pi be a correct process calling start() at ti ≤ Slast < t. If pi.view+(ti) = 0, then at
ti, pi sends WISH(1) to all processes by executing the code in line 3. Otherwise, by (15)
and (ii), pi.view+(ti) = 1, and pi sent WISH(1) when pi.view+ first became equal to 1 at
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some time si < ti ≤ Slast < t. Since postGST(t) holds, in both cases, pi sends WISH(v)
with v ≥ 1 sometime between GST and t. By (13) and (ii), we have v = 1. Thus, we
get that all correct processes send WISH(1) to all processes in-between GST and t. By
Lemma 30, this implies that all correct processes enter view 1 and Elast(1) ≤ t+δ = t2 +δ.
Since t1 = t2, we also have Elast(1) ≤ min(t1 + 2δ, t2 + δ), as needed.
Thus, we get that in all three cases above, all correct processes enter view 1, and Elast(1) ≤
min(t1 + 2δ, t2 + δ), as required. uunionsq
I Lemma 32. Let t ≥ GST be a time such that postGST(t) holds, T = t+F (GV(t)) + δ, and
assume GV(t) > 0, and no correct process sends WISH(v) with v > GV(t) + 1 before T + δ.
Then all correct processes send WISH(GV(t) + 1) to all processes no later than at T + δ.
Proof Since GV(t) > 0, the definition of GV implies that there exists a correct process pl such
that pl entered GV(t) and El(GV(t)) ≤ t. By the view entry condition, pl.view(El(GV(t))) =
GV(t), and therefore pl.max_views(El(GV(t))) includes 2f + 1 entries ≥ GV(t). Since f + 1
of these entries belong to correct processes, there exists a set C of f + 1 correct processes,
each of which sends WISH(v) with v ≥ GV(t) to all processes before El(GV(t)) ≤ t. Since
postGST(t) holds, pi sends WISH(v′) with v′ ≥ GV(t) sometime between GST and t. Since no
correct process sends WISH(v′) with v′ > GV(t) + 1 before t < t+ F (GV(t)) + 2δ = T + δ, we
have:
∀pi ∈ C. ∃ti.∃v′i. pi sends WISH(v′i) at ti ∧ GST ≤ ti < t ∧ v′i ∈ {GV(t),GV(t) + 1}.
Since after GST every message sent by a correct process is received by all correct processes
within δ of its transmission, the above implies that by t+ δ every correct process receives a
WISH(v) with v ∈ {GV(t),GV(t) + 1} from each process in C.
Consider an arbitrary correct process pj and let tj ≤ t + δ be the earliest time by
which pj receives WISH(v) with v ∈ {GV(t),GV(t) + 1} from each process in C. Since
tj ≤ t+ δ < T + δ and no correct process sends WISH(v) with v > GV(t) + 1 before T + δ,
we get that for all processes pi ∈ C, pj .max_views[i](tj) ∈ {GV(t),GV(t) + 1}, and for all
correct processes pk, pj .max_views[k](tj) ≤ GV(t) + 1. Since |C| = f + 1, this implies
pj .view+(tj) ∈ {GV(t),GV(t) + 1}. If pj .view+(tj) > pj .prev_v+(tj), then at tj the process
pj sends WISH(v) with v = pj .view+(tj) ∈ {GV(t),GV(t) + 1} by executing the code in line 21.
Otherwise, pk must have already sent WISH(v) with v = pj .view+(tj) ∈ {GV(t),GV(t) + 1}
to all processes at some time before tj ≤ t+ δ. Thus, in both cases pj sends WISH(v) with
v ∈ {GV(t),GV(t) + 1} to all processes no later than t+ δ. Then Lemma 27 implies that pj
also sends WISH(v′) with v′ ∈ {GV(t),GV(t) + 1} to all processes sometime between GST and
t+ δ, inclusive.
Consider an arbitrary correct process pk and let tk be the earliest time by which pk
receives WISH(v) with v ∈ {GV(t),GV(t) + 1} from each correct process, with the message
being sent between GST and t+ δ. Then
tk ≤ t+ 2δ = (t+ F (GV(t)) + δ) + δ − F (GV(t)) = T + δ − F (GV(t)). (16)
Since no correct process sends WISH(v) with v > GV(t) + 1 before T + δ, for all correct
processes pj , we have pk.max_views[j](tk) ∈ {GV(t),GV(t) + 1}. Since there are 2f + 1
correct processes, by the definitions of view and view+, pk.view(tk) ∈ {GV(t),GV(t) + 1} and
pk.view+(tk) ∈ {GV(t),GV(t) + 1}. Thus, given that pk.view(tk) ≤ pk.view+(tk), there are
three cases to consider: (i) pk.view(tk) = GV(t)∧pk.view+(tk) = GV(t) +1; (ii) pk.view(tk) =
pk.view+(tk) = GV(t) + 1; and (iii) pk.view(tk) = pk.view+(tk) = GV(t);
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Suppose first that either (i) or (ii) holds. Then pk.view+(tk) = GV(t) + 1 and therefore,
pk either sends WISH(GV(t) + 1) by executing line 21 at tk, or sent it when pk.view+ first
became equal to GV(t) + 1 sometime before tk. Then pk sends WISH(GV(t) + 1) to all correct
processes no later than tk, and by (16) we have tk ≤ T + δ, as required.
Suppose now that (iii) holds. Then pk enters GV(t) at Ek(GV(t)) ≤ tk and starts
pk.timer_view for the duration of F (GV(t)). Since tk > GST, and the clocks of the correct
processes advance at the same rate as real time after GST, pk.timer_view cannot last past
tk + F (GV(t)). Let sk be the time at which pk.timer_view either expires or is stopped
prematurely by executing the code in line 17; then Ek(GV(t)) < sk ≤ tk + F (GV(t)). We
consider two cases.
pk.timer_view expires at sk, so that at this time pk executes the code in lines 4-5. Since (16)
implies tk + F (GV(t)) ≤ T + δ, we get
sk ≤ T + δ. (17)
We consider two cases:
sk < tk. We have
pk.view(Ek(GV(t))) = pk.view+(Ek(GV(t))) = pk.view(tk) = pk.view+(tk) = GV(t).
(18)
Since pk.view and pk.view+ are non-decreasing, this implies pk.view(sk) =
pk.view+(sk) = GV(t). Then max(pk.view(sk) + 1, pk.view+(sk)) = pk.view(sk) + 1 =
GV(t) + 1, and thus, pk sends WISH(GV(t) + 1) to all processes at sk. By (17) this
implies the required.
tk ≤ sk ≤ tk + F (GV(t)). Since no correct process sends WISH(v) with v > GV(t) + 1
before T + δ, from (17) we get pk.view(sk) ≤ pk.view+(sk) ≤ GV(t) + 1. Since
pk.view(tk) = pk.view+(tk) = GV(t) and both pk.view and pk.view+ are non-decreasing,
tk ≤ sk implies
pk.view(sk) = GV(t) ∧ pk.view+(sk) ∈ {GV(t),GV(t) + 1} ∨
pk.view(sk) = pk.view+(sk) = GV(t) + 1.
If the first disjunct holds, then max(pk.view(sk) + 1, pk.view+(sk)) = GV(t) + 1, and
therefore pk sends WISH(GV(t)+1) to all processes at sk. Otherwise, pk enters GV(t)+1
prior to the expiration of pk.timer_view at sk, which is impossible. Hence, in both cases
pk sends WISH(GV(t) + 1) to all processes at sk, which by (17) implies the required.
pk.timer_view is stopped prematurely at sk, by executing the code in line 17. Then the
condition in line 16 is true at sk, so that
pk.view+(sk) = pk.view(sk) ∧ pk.view(sk) > pk.prev_v(sk). (19)
We consider two cases.
sk < tk. We again have (18), so that pk.view(sk) = pk.view+(sk) = GV(t). But since
pk enters GV(t) prior to sk, we have pk.prev_v(sk) = GV(t), contradicting (19). Hence,
this case is impossible.
sk ≥ tk. Since pk.view(tk) = pk.view+(tk) = GV(t) and both pk.view and pk.view+
are non-decreasing, (19) implies that pk.view(sk) = pk.view+(sk) ≥ GV(t) + 1. Since
no correct process sends WISH(v) with v > GV(t) + 1 before T + δ, from (17) we
get pk.view(sk) = pk.view+(sk) = GV(t) + 1. If pk.view+(sk) > pk.prev_v+(sk), then
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the condition in line 21 is true at sk, and therefore, pk sends WISH(pk.view+(sk)) =
WISH(GV(t) + 1) to all processes at sk. Otherwise, pk.view+(sk) = pk.prev_v+(sk),
which implies that pk sent WISH(GV(t) + 1) when pk.view+ first became equal to
GV(t) + 1 sometime before sk. Thus, in both cases pk sends WISH(GV(t) + 1) by sk,
and the required follows from (17).
uunionsq
I Lemma 33. Global view keeps increasing ∀t.∃t′ > t.GV(t′) > GV(t).
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exists a time t such that for all t′ ≥ t, GV(t′) ≤
GV(t). Since GV is non-decreasing, this implies that for all t′ ≥ t, GV(t′) = GV(t), and for
all times t′′ < t, GV(t′′) ≤ GV(t). Thus, we have
∀t. ∀v ≥ GV(t) + 1.¬(pi enters v at t ∧ pi is correct). (20)
Furthermore, if there is a correct process that sends WISH(v) with v > GV(t) + 1 at any time
s, then by Lemma 15, a correct process pi attempts to advance from v − 1 > GV(t) at some
time s′ ≤ s. Thus, LVi(s) = LVi(s′) = v − 1 ≥ GV(t) + 1, and therefore, GV(s) ≥ GV(t) + 1.
Hence, by Lemma 18, some correct process must enter GV(t) + 1, contradicting (20). Thus,
we have
∀t. ∀v > GV(t) + 1.¬(pi sends WISH(v) at t ∧ pi is correct). (21)
Since we assume that all correct processes eventually call start(), there exists a time
t∗ = max{t,GST + ρ, Slast}. Our choice of t∗ implies that t∗ ≥ GST + ρ, and therefore, by
Lemma 26 we have:
t∗ ≥ GST ∧ postGST(t∗). (22)
Since t∗ ≥ t, we also have GV(t∗) = GV(t).
Suppose first that GV(t) = 0. Let
t1 = max(Sf+1, t∗) = t∗;
t2 = max(Slast, t∗) = t∗;
T = max(min(t1, t2 − δ), t∗) = max(min(t∗, t∗ − δ), t∗) = t∗.
By (21), no correct process can send WISH(v) with v > 1 before T + 2δ. Since (22) holds, by
Lemma 31, all correct processes enter view 1, which is a contradiction to (20).
Suppose that GV(t) > 0. Let T = t∗ + F (GV(t∗)) + δ. By (21), no correct process sends
WISH(v) with v > GV(t∗) + 1 before T + 2δ. Thus, (22), and Lemma 32 imply that all
correct processes send WISH(GV(t∗) + 1) to all processes no later than T + δ. Since (22) holds,
by Lemma 30, all correct processes enter GV(t∗) + 1 by T + 2δ, which is a contradiction
to (20). uunionsq
I Lemma 34. Assume a correct process enters a view v, Efirst(v) ≥ GST, postGST(Efirst(v))
holds, and F (v) > 2δ. Then all correct processes enter the view v + 1 and Elast(v + 1) ≤
Elast(v) + F (v) + δ.
Proof. If some correct process enters the view v + 1 before T = Elast(v) + F (v)− δ, then
by Lemma 28, all correct processes enter the view v + 1 and
Elast(v + 1) ≤ Efirst(v + 1) + 2δ ≤ T + 2δ = Elast(v) + F (v)− δ + 2δ = Elast(v) + F (v) + δ,
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as required.
Suppose that no correct process enters v+1 before T . We have T = Efirst(v)+F (v)−δ >
Efirst(v) ≥ GST. By Lemmas 33 and 18, some correct process eventually enters v + 1, and
therefore, by Corollary 24, T ≥ GST implies that no correct process can send WISH(v′) for
any v′ > v + 1 earlier than T + F (v + 1). Thus, given that F (v + 1) ≥ F (v) > 2δ, we get:
no correct process sends WISH(v′) with v′ > v + 1 before T + 2δ. (23)
By Lemma 28, all correct processes enter v. Let pi be a correct process that enters v
at Ei(v); at this moment pi starts pi.timer_view for the duration of F (v). Since Ei(v) ≥
Efirst(v) ≥ GST, and the clocks of the correct processes advance at the same rate as real
time after GST, pi.timer_view cannot last past Ei(v) +F (v) ≤ Elast(v) +F (v). Let si be the
time at which pi.timer_view either expires or is stopped prematurely by executing the code
in line 17; then Ei(v) < si ≤ Elast(v) + F (v), and therefore,
si ≤ Elast(v) + F (v) = (Elast(v) + F (v)− δ) + δ = T + δ. (24)
We consider two cases.
pi.timer_view expires at si, so that at this time pi executes the code in lines 4-5. Since
from (23), no correct process sends WISH(v′) with v′ > v + 1 before T + δ, from (24) we
get pi.view(si) ≤ pi.view+(si) ≤ v + 1. Since pi.view(Ei(v)) = pi.view+(Ei(v)) = v, both
pi.view and pi.view+ are non-decreasing, and pi.view ≤ pi.view+, Ei(v) ≤ si implies
pi.view(si) = v ∧ pi.view+(si) ∈ {v, v + 1} ∨ pi.view(si) = pi.view+(si) = v + 1.
If the first disjunct holds, then max(pi.view(si) + 1, pi.view+(si)) = v+ 1, and therefore pi
sends WISH(v+ 1) to all processes at si. Otherwise, pi enters v+ 1 prior to the expiration
of pi.timer_view at si, which is impossible. Hence, pi sends WISH(v + 1) to all processes
at si.
pi.timer_view is stopped prematurely at si, by executing the code in line 17. Then the
condition in line 16 is true at si, so that
pi.view+(si) = pi.view(si) ∧ pi.view(si) > pi.prev_v(si). (25)
Since pi.view(Ei(v)) = pi.view+(Ei(v)) = v and both pi.view and pi.view+ are non-
decreasing, (25) implies that pi.view(si) = pi.view+(si) ≥ v + 1. Since by (23), no correct
process sends WISH(v′) with v′ > v + 1 before T + δ, from (24) we get pi.view(si) =
pi.view+(si) = v + 1. If pi.view+(si) > pi.prev_v+(si), then the condition in line 21 is
true at si, and therefore, pi sends WISH(pi.view+(si)) = WISH(v + 1) to all processes at si.
Otherwise, pi.view+(si) = pi.prev_v+(si), which implies that pi sent WISH(v + 1) when
pi.view+ first became equal to v + 1 sometime before si. Thus, in both cases pi sends
WISH(v + 1) by si.
Thus, we get that for each correct process pi, there exists a time si ≤ T + δ such that at
si, pi sends WISH(v + 1) to all processes. By (24), this implies that all correct processes send
WISH(v + 1) to all correct processes no later than s = max{si} ≤ T + δ. Then Lemma 30
implies the required. uunionsq
Since by Lemma 26, postGST(t) holds for all t > GST + ρ, from Lemma 34 we get
I Corollary 35. For all views v, if a correct process enters v, Efirst(v) > GST + ρ, and
F (v) > 2δ, then all correct processes enter the view v+1 and Elast(v+1) ≤ Elast(v)+F (v)+δ.
I Theorem 36. FastSync satisfies Properties 1-5 in Figure 1 for d = 2δ.
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Proof. Property 1 is satisfied trivially. Let V be the first view such that a correct process
enters V, Efirst(V) > GST + ρ and F (V) > 2δ. Such a view exists by (1) and Lemma 33.
Since Efirst(V) > GST + ρ > GST, the view V satisfies Property 2. By Lemmas 18 and 33, a
correct process enters every view v ≥ V. By Corollary 20,
Efirst(v) ≥ Efirst(V) > GST. (26)
Since F is a non-decreasing function, F (v) > 2δ. Thus, by Corollary 29, all correct
processes enter v, and Elast(v) ≤ Efirst(v) + 2δ, which validates Properties 3 and 4. To prove
Property 5, fix a view v ≥ V. By (26), Efirst(v) > GST, and therefore, by Corollary 23, we
get Efirst(v + 1) ≥ Efirst(v) + F (v), which implies Property 5. uunionsq
I Theorem 37. Assume that Sfirst ≥ GST and F (1) > 2δ. Then FastSync satisfies
Properties 1-5, A and B in Figure 1 for V = 1 and d = 2δ.
Proof. Property 1 is satisfied trivially. Let V = 1. By Lemmas 18 and 33, some correct
process enters V. To prove Property 2, let pi be a correct process that enters V = 1 at
Efirst(1). By Lemma 16, there exists a time t < Efirst(1) at which some correct process
attempts to advance from view 0. Thus, by Lemma 17, there exists a time s ≤ t < Efirst(1)
at which some correct process calls start. Since s ≥ Sfirst, Efirst(1) > Sfirst ≥ GST. Thus,
Property 2 holds.
By Lemmas 18 and 33, some correct process enters every view v ≥ 1 = V. Thus,
Corollary 20 implies that
Efirst(v) ≥ Efirst(1) ≥ Sfirst ≥ GST. (27)
Then by Lemma 25, postGST(Efirst(v)) holds. Since F is a non-decreasing function, F (v) ≥
F (1) > 2δ. Thus, by Lemma 28, all correct processes enter v, and Elast(v) ≤ Efirst(v) + 2δ,
which validates Properties 3 and 4 for d = 2δ.
To prove Properties 5 and A, fix a view v ≥ V . By (27), Efirst(v) > GST, and therefore, by
Corollary 23, we get Efirst(v+ 1) ≥ Efirst(v) +F (v), which implies Property 5. Since by (27),
Efirst(v) ≥ Sfirst, by Lemma 25, postGST(Efirst(v)) holds. We also have F (v) ≥ F (1) > 2δ.
Thus, by Corollary 35, Elast(v + 1) ≤ Elast(v) + F (v) + δ, and therefore, Property A holds.
To prove Property B, let
t1 = max(Sf+1, Sfirst) = Sf+1;
t2 = max(Slast, Sfirst) = Slast;
T = max(min(Sf+1, Slast − δ), Sfirst).
Suppose first that T = Sfirst. Then by (27), GV(T ) = GV(Sfirst) = 0. Since GV is
non-decreasing, Efirst(V) ≥ T = Sfirst ≥ GST. Thus, by Corollary 24, no correct process
can send WISH(v) for any v > 1 earlier than T + F (1) > T + 2δ. Since by Lemma 25,
postGST(Sfirst) holds, by Lemma 31, Elast(V) ≤ min(t1 + 2δ, t2 + δ) ≤ t2 + δ = Slast + δ, as
needed.
Suppose next that T = min(Sf+1, Slast − δ) > Sfirst. If some correct process enters view
V before T , then by Lemma 28,
Elast(1) ≤ T + 2δ = min(Sf+1 + 2δ, Slast + δ) ≤ Slast + δ,
as needed. On the other hand, if no correct process enters V = 1 before T , then GV(T ) = 0.
Since GV is non-decreasing, Efirst(V) ≥ T > Sfirst ≥ GST. Thus, by Corollary 24, no correct
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process can send WISH(v) for any v > 1 earlier than T + F (1) > T + 2δ. Since by Lemma 25,
postGST(Sfirst) holds, by Lemma 31 we have Elast(V) ≤ min(t1+2δ, t2+δ) ≤ t2+δ = Slast+δ,
as needed. Thus, we proved that in all cases, Elast(V) ≤ min(t1 + 2δ, t2 + δ), which implies
the required. uunionsq
I Theorem 38. Let V = GV(GST + ρ) + 1 and d = 2δ. Assume that Sf+1 ≤ GST + ρ and
F (V) > 2δ. Then FastSync satisfies Properties 1-5, A and C in Figure 1.
Proof. Property 1 is satisfied trivially. Let V = GV(GST + ρ) + 1. By Lemmas 18 and 33,
some correct process enters V . By Lemma 19, GV(Efirst(V)) = V . Since GV is non-decreasing,
and V > GV(GST + ρ), we have Efirst(V) > GST + ρ ≥ GST. Hence, Property 2 holds. By
Lemmas 18 and 33, some correct process enters every view v ≥ V. By Corollary 20, v ≥ V
implies that
Efirst(v) ≥ Efirst(V) ≥ GST + ρ. (28)
Since F is a non-decreasing function, F (v) ≥ F (V) > 2δ. Thus, by Corollary 29, all correct
processes enter v and Elast(v) ≤ Efirst(v) + 2δ, which validates Properties 3 and 4.
To prove Properties 5 and A, fix a view v ≥ V . By (28), Efirst(v) ≥ GST, and therefore, by
Corollary 23 we get Efirst(v + 1) ≥ Efirst(v) + F (v), which implies Property 5. Since by (28),
Efirst(v) ≥ GST+ρ, by Lemma 26, postGST(Efirst(v)) holds. We also have F (v) ≥ F (V) > 2δ.
Thus, by Corollary 35, Elast(v + 1) ≤ Elast(v) + F (v) + δ, and therefore, Property A holds.
To prove Property C, we consider two cases:
GV(GST + ρ) = 0. Hence, V = 1. Let
t1 = max(Sf+1,GST + ρ);
t2 = max(Slast,GST + ρ);
T = max(min(Sf+1, Slast − δ),GST + ρ).
Since Sf+1 ≤ GST+ρ and min(GST+ρ, Slast−δ) ≤ GST+ρ, the above can be re-written
as follows:
t1 = max(Sf+1,GST + ρ) = GST + ρ;
t2 = max(Slast,GST + ρ);
T = GST + ρ.
Then GV(T ) = 0. Since GV is non-decreasing, Efirst(1) ≥ GST. Thus, by Corollary 24,
no correct process can send WISH(v) for any v > 1 earlier than T + F (1) > T + 2δ. Since
by Lemma 26, postGST(GST + ρ) holds, by Lemma 31, Elast(V) ≤ min(t1 + 2δ, t2 + δ) ≤
t1 + 2δ = GST + ρ+ 2δ. Since F (0) = 0, we have
Elast(V) ≤ GST + ρ+ F (GV(GST + ρ)) + 2δ,
which implies the upper bound stipulated by Property C.
GV(GST+ρ) > 0. Let T = GST+ρ+F (GV(GST+ρ))+δ. Suppose first that some correct
process enters GV(GST+ ρ) + 1 before T . By Lemma 19, GV(Efirst(GV(GST+ ρ) + 1)) =
GV(GST+ρ) + 1. Since GV is non-decreasing, we have Efirst(GV(GST+ρ) + 1) > GST+ρ.
Thus, by Corollary 29, all correct processes enter V by GST + ρ+ F (GV(GST + ρ)) + 3δ,
as needed. Suppose now that no correct processes enters V before T , so that Efirst(V) ≥
T ≥ GST. Then by Corollary 24,
no correct process can send WISH(v) for any v > V earlier than T + F (V) > T + 2δ.
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(29)
From Lemma 26, postGST(GST + ρ), and therefore, by Lemma 32, all correct processes
send WISH(V) to all processes no later than T + δ. Since (29) holds, by Lemma 30, all
correct processes enter V, and Elast(V) ≤ T + 2δ = GST + ρ+ F (GV(GST + ρ)) + 3δ, as
needed.
uunionsq
Proof of Theorem 1. Follows from Theorems 36-38. uunionsq
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B Additional Material on Consensus Protocols
B.1 Safety Proof for Single-Shot HotStuff
The protocol satisfies the Validity property, because deciding on a value requires preparing
it, and due to the validity check in SafeProposal, any prepared value is valid:
I Proposition 39. ∀v, C, x. prepared(C, v, hash(x)) ∧ wf(C) =⇒ valid(x).
Proof. Fix v, C and x and assume prepared(C, v, hash(x)). Since prepared(C, v, hash(x)),
a quorum Q of processes sent PREPARED(v, hash(x)). Then at least f + 1 correct processes
checked the validity of x in the SafeProposal predicate, which implies the required. uunionsq
Let committed(C, v, h) ⇐⇒ ∃Q. quorum(Q) ∧ C = {〈COMMITTED(v, h)〉j | pj ∈ Q}.
I Lemma 40. ∀v, v′, C, C ′, x, x′. committed(C, v, hash(x)) ∧ prepared(C ′, v′, hash(x′)) ∧
wf(C) ∧ wf(C ′) ∧ v < v′ =⇒ x = x′.
Proof. Fix v, C and x and assume committed(C, v, hash(x)). We prove by induction on v′
that
∀v′, C ′, x′. prepared(C ′, v′, hash(x′)) ∧ wf(C ′) ∧ v < v′ =⇒ x = x′.
Assume this holds for all v′ < v∗; we now prove it for v′ = v∗. To this end, assume v < v′
and prepared(C ′, v′, hash(x′)) for a well-formed C ′.
Since committed(C, v, hash(x)), a quorum Q of processes sent COMMITTED(v, hash(x)).
Since prepared(C ′, v′, hash(x′)), a quorum Q′ of processes sent PREPARED(v′, hash(x′)). The
quorums Q and Q′ have to intersect in some correct process pk, which has thus sent both
COMMITTED(v, hash(x)) and PREPARED(v′, hash(x′)). Since v < v′, process pk must have sent
COMMITTED(v, hash(x)) before PREPARED(v′, hash(x′)). Before sending COMMITTED(v, hash(x))
the process set locked_view to v (line 24) and had prepared_val = x.
Assume towards a contradiction that x 6= x′. Let v′′ be the first view after v when
pk prepared some proposal x′′ 6= x, so that v′′ ≤ v′. When this happened, by Proposi-
tion 4 pk must have had prepared_val = x and locked_view ≥ v. Then by the SafeProposal
check (line 12), the leader of v′′ provided a well-formed prepared certificate C ′′ such that
prepared(C ′′, v′′′, hash(x′′)) for v′′′ such that v < v′′′ < v′′ ≤ v′. But then by induction
hypothesis we have x′′ = x, and above we established x′′ 6= x: a contradiction. Hence, we
must have x = x′, as required. uunionsq
I Proposition 41. ∀v, C, h. committed(C, v, h) ∧ wf(C) =⇒ ∃C ′. prepared(C ′, v, h) ∧ wf(C ′).
I Corollary 42. Single-shot HotStuff satisfies Agreement.
Proof. Assume two correct processes decide on values x and x′ in views v and v′, respectively.
Then committed(C, v, hash(x)) and committed(C ′, v′, hash(x′)) for some well-formed C and
C ′. By Proposition 41 we have prepared(C0, v, hash(x)) and prepared(C ′0, v′, hash(x′)) for
some well-formed C0 and C ′0. Without loss of generality assume v ≤ v′. If v = v′, then
x = x′ by Proposition 3. If v < v′, then x = x′ by Lemma 40. uunionsq
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B.2 Pseudocode of Two-Phase HotStuff
1 upon new_view(v)
2 curr_view← v;
3 voted← false;
4 stop_timer(timer_newleader);
5 if pi = leader(curr_view) then
6 start_timer(timer_newleader, Fp(curr_view));
7 send 〈NEWLEADER(curr_view, prepared_view, prepared_val, cert)〉i
8 to leader(curr_view);
9 when timer_newleader expired and
received {〈NEWLEADER(v, viewj , valj , certj)〉j | pj ∈ P} = M
10 pre: curr_view = v ∧ pi = leader(v) ∧ (∀m ∈M.ValidNewLeader(m));
11 if ∃j. viewj = max{viewk | pk ∈ P} 6= 0 then
12 send 〈PROPOSE(v, valj , certj)〉i to all;
13 else
14 send 〈PROPOSE(v, myval(),⊥)〉i to all;
15 when received 〈PROPOSE(v, x, _)〉j = m
16 pre: curr_view= v ∧ voted= false ∧ SafeProposal(m);
17 curr_val← x;
18 voted← true;
19 send 〈PREPARED(v, hash(curr_val))〉i to all;
20 when received {〈PREPARED(v, h)〉j | pj ∈ Q} = C for a quorum Q
21 pre: curr_view = v ∧ voted = true ∧ hash(curr_val) = h;
22 prepared_val← curr_val;
23 prepared_view← curr_view;
24 locked_view← curr_view;
25 cert← C;
26 send 〈COMMITTED(v, h)〉i to all;
27 when received {〈COMMITTED(v, h)〉j | pj ∈ Q} for a quorum Q
28 pre: curr_view = locked_view = v ∧ hash(curr_val) = h;
29 decide(curr_val);
The predicates prepared, ValidNewLeader and SafeProposal are as defined in Figure 3.
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B.3 Single-Shot All-to-All PBFT
1 upon new_view(v)
2 curr_view← v;
3 voted← false;
4 send 〈NEWLEADER(curr_view, locked_view, prepared_val, cert)〉i
to leader(curr_view);
5 when received {〈NEWLEADER(v, viewj , valj , certj)〉j | pj ∈ Q} = M
for a quorum Q
6 pre: curr_view = v ∧ pi = leader(v) ∧ (∀m ∈M.ValidNewLeader(m));
7 if ∃j. viewj = max{viewk | pk ∈ Q} 6= 0 then
8 send 〈PROPOSE(v, valj ,M)〉i to all;
9 else
10 send 〈PROPOSE(v, myval(),M)〉i to all;
11 when received 〈PROPOSE(v, x, _)〉j = m
12 pre: curr_view = v ∧ voted = false ∧ SafeProposal(m);
13 curr_val← x;
14 voted← true;
15 send 〈PREPARED(v, hash(curr_val))〉i to all;
16 when received {〈PREPARED(v, h)〉j | pj ∈ Q} = C for a quorum Q
17 pre: curr_view = v ∧ voted = true ∧ hash(curr_val) = h;
18 prepared_val← curr_val;
19 locked_view← curr_view;
20 cert← C;
21 send 〈COMMITTED(v, h)〉i to all;
22 when received {〈COMMITTED(v, h)〉j | pj ∈ Q} for a quorum Q
23 pre: curr_view = locked_view = v ∧ hash(curr_val) = h;
24 decide(curr_val);
prepared(C, v, h) ⇐⇒ ∃Q. quorum(Q) ∧ C = {〈PREPARED(v, h)〉j | pj ∈ Q}
ValidNewLeader(〈NEWLEADER(v′, v, x, C)〉_) ⇐⇒ v < v′ ∧ (v 6= 0 =⇒ prepared(C, v, hash(x)))
SafeProposal(〈PROPOSE(v, x,M)〉i) ⇐⇒
pi = leader(v) ∧ valid(x) ∧
∃Q, view, val, cert. quorum(Q) ∧
M = {〈NEWLEADER(v, viewj , valj , certj)〉j | pj ∈ Q} ∧
(∀m ∈M.ValidNewLeader(m)) ∧
((∃j. viewj 6= 0) =⇒ (∃j. viewj = max{viewk | pk ∈ Q} ∧ x = valj))
In view 1 the leader can propose without waiting for NEWLEADER messages, and processes can
avoid sending these messages to this leader.
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Safety
I Proposition 43. ∀v, C, x. prepared(C, v, hash(x)) ∧ wf(C) =⇒ valid(x).
This proposition implies that the protocol satisfies Validity. We next prove Agreement.
I Proposition 44. The variables curr_view and locked_view at a correct process never decrease
and we always have locked_view ≤ curr_view.
I Proposition 45. ∀v, C,C ′, x, x′. prepared(C, v, hash(x)) ∧ prepared(C ′, v, hash(x′)) ∧
wf(C) ∧ wf(C ′) =⇒ x = x′.
I Proposition 46. ∀v, C, h. committed(C, v, h) ∧ wf(C) =⇒ ∃C ′. prepared(C, v, h) ∧ wf(C ′).
I Lemma 47. ∀v, v′, x, x′,m. committed(_, v, hash(x)) ∧m = 〈PROPOSE(v′, x′, _)〉_ ∧
wf(m) ∧ SafeProposal(m) =⇒ x′ = x.
Proof. Fix v, C and x and assume committed(C, v, hash(x)). We prove by induction on v′
that
∀m, v′, x′.m = 〈PROPOSE(v′, x′, _)〉_ ∧ wf(m) ∧ SafeProposal(m) =⇒ x′ = x.
Assume this holds for all v′ < v∗; we now prove it for v′ = v∗. To this end, assume v < v′
and m = 〈PROPOSE(v′, x′,M)〉_ is a sent message such that SafeProposal(m). Since a correct
node only prepares proposals satisfying SafeProposal (line 12), from the induction hypothesis
it follows that
∀C ′′, v′′, x′′. v < v′′ < v′ ∧ prepared(C ′′, v′′, hash(x′′)) ∧ wf(C ′′) =⇒ x = x′′.
Furthermore, by Propositions 45 and 46 we have
∀C ′′, x′′. prepared(C ′′, v, hash(x′′)) ∧ wf(C ′′) =⇒ x = x′′,
so that overall we get
∀C ′′, v′′, x′′. v ≤ v′′ < v′ ∧ prepared(C ′′, v′′, hash(x′′)) ∧ wf(C ′′) =⇒ x = x′′. (30)
Let
M = {〈NEWLEADER(v′, viewj , valj , certj)〉j | pj ∈ Q}
for some quorum Q. Since SafeProposal(m), we have ∀m′ ∈M.ValidNewLeader(m′), so that
∀pj ∈ Q. viewj < v′ ∧ (viewj 6= 0 =⇒ prepared(certj , viewj , hash(valj)) ∧ wf(certj)).
From this and (30) we get that
∀pj ∈ Q. viewj ≥ v =⇒ valj = x. (31)
Since committed(C, v, h), a quorum Q′ of processes sent COMMITTED(v, h). The quo-
rums Q and Q′ have to intersect in some correct process pk, which has thus sent both
COMMITTED(v, hash(x)) and NEWLEADER(v′, viewk, valk, certk). Since v < v′, this process pk
must have sent the COMMITTED message before the NEWLEADER message. Before sending
COMMITTED(v, hash(x)) the process set locked_view to v (line 19). Then by Proposition 44
process pk must have had locked_view ≥ v when it sent the NEWLEADER message. Hence,
viewk ≥ v 6= 0 and max{viewj | pj ∈ Q} ≥ v. Then from (31) for any j such that
viewj = max{viewk | pk ∈ Q} we must have valj = x. Since SafeProposal(m) holds, this
implies x′ = x. uunionsq
I Corollary 48. ∀v, v′, C, C ′, x, x′. committed(C, v, hash(x)) ∧ prepared(C ′, v′, hash(x′)) ∧
wf(C) ∧ wf(C ′) ∧ v < v′ =⇒ x = x′.
I Corollary 49. PBFT satisfies Agreement.
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Liveness
I Theorem 50. Let v ≥ V be a view such that F (v) > 6δ and leader(v) is correct. Then all
correct processes decide at v by Elast(v) + 4δ.
Proof. By Property 2, we have Efirst(v) ≥ GST, so that all messages sent by correct
processes after Efirst(v) get delivered to all correct processes within δ. Once a correct process
enters v, it sends its NEWLEADER message, so that leader(v) is guaranteed to receive a quorum
of such messages by Elast(v) + δ. When this happens, the leader will send its proposal in
a PROPOSE message, which correct processes will receive by Elast(v) + 2δ. If they deem the
proposal safe, it takes them at most 2δ to exchange the sequence of PREPARED and COMMITTED
messages leading to decisions. By (2), all correct processes will stay in v until at least
Elast(v) + (F (v)− d) > Elast(v) + 4δ. Thus, the sequence of message exchanges will complete
before any of them exits view v, and all correct processes will decide in this view by the time
Elast(v) + 4δ.
It remains to show that the proposal x that leader(v) makes in view v (line 5) will be
deemed safe by all correct processes according to the SafeProposal predicate (line 11). All
the conjuncts of SafeProposal except for valid(x) are trivially satisfied given that leader(v) is
correct. If the leader is choosing its own proposal as x, then it is valid because correct processes
propose valid values. Otherwise, from ValidNewLeader we get that prepared(C, _, hash(x)) for
a well-formed C. Hence, by Proposition 43 we again have valid(x). uunionsq
I Corollary 51. Let F be such that (1) holds. Then all correct processes eventually decide.
Latency under favorable conditions
I Corollary 52. Assume that Sfirst ≥ GST and F (1) > 6δ. Then in the PBFT protocol all
correct processes decide no later than Slast +
∑f
k=1(F (k) + δ) + 5δ.
I Corollary 53. Assume that Sfirst ≥ GST, F (1) > 5δ and leader(1) is correct. Then in the
PBFT protocol all correct processes decide no later than Slast + 4δ.
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B.4 Single-Shot All-to-All SBFT
1 upon new_view(v)
2 curr_view← v;
3 voted← false;
4 send 〈NEWLEADER(curr_view, locked_view, prepared_val, cert, pre_view, curr_val)〉i
to leader(curr_view);
5 when received
{〈NEWLEADER(v, viewj , valj , certj , pre_viewj , cur_valj)〉j | pj ∈ Q} = M
for a quorum Q
6 pre: curr_view = v ∧ pi = leader(v) ∧ (∀m ∈M.ValidNewLeader(m));
7 let (xslow, vslow)← (⊥, 0);
8 if ∃j. viewj = max{viewk | pk ∈ Q} 6= 0 then (xslow, vslow)← (valj , viewj);
9 let D ← {(x, v′) | ∃P ⊆ Q. |P | = f + 1 ∧ (∀pj ∈ P. cur_valj = x) ∧
v′ = min{pre_viewj | pj ∈ P}};
let (xfast, vfast)← (⊥,max{v′ | (_, v′) ∈ D});
if ∃!x. (x, vfast) ∈ D then xfast ← x else vfast = 0;
10 if vslow ≥ vfast ∧ vslow > 0 then send 〈PROPOSE(v, xslow,M)〉i to all;
11 else if vfast > vslow then send 〈PROPOSE(v, xfast,M)〉i to all;
12 else send 〈PROPOSE(v, myval(),M)〉i to all;
13 when received 〈PROPOSE(v, x, _)〉j = m
14 pre: curr_view = v ∧ voted = false ∧ SafeProposal(m);
15 curr_val← x;
16 pre_view← curr_view;
17 voted← true;
18 stop_timer(timer_fast_path);
19 start_timer(timer_fast_path, Ff (curr_view));
20 send 〈PREPARED(v, hash(curr_val))〉i to all;
21 when received {〈PREPARED(v, h)〉j | pj ∈ P}
22 pre: curr_view = v ∧ voted = true ∧ hash(curr_val) = h;
23 decide(curr_val);
24 when timer_fast_path expired and
received {〈PREPARED(v, h)〉j | pj ∈ Q} = C for at least a quorum Q
25 pre: curr_view = v ∧ voted = true ∧ hash(curr_val) = h;
26 prepared_val← curr_val;
27 locked_view← curr_view;
28 cert← C;
29 send 〈COMMITTED(v, h)〉i to all;
30 when received {〈COMMITTED(v, h)〉j | pj ∈ Q} for a quorum Q
31 pre: curr_view = locked_view = v ∧ hash(curr_val) = h;
32 decide(curr_val);
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prepared(C, v, h) ⇐⇒ ∃Q. quorum(Q) ∧ C = {〈PREPARED(v, h)〉j | pj ∈ Q}
ValidNewLeader(〈NEWLEADER(v′, v, x, C, v0, x0)〉_) ⇐⇒
v ≤ v0 < v′ ∧ (v 6= 0 =⇒ prepared(C, v, hash(x)))
SafeProposal(〈PROPOSE(v, x,M)〉i) ⇐⇒
pi = leader(v) ∧ valid(x) ∧
∃Q, view, val, cert, pre_view, cur_val. quorum(Q) ∧
M = {〈NEWLEADER(v, viewj , valj , certj , pre_viewj , cur_valj)〉j | pj ∈ Q} ∧
(∀m ∈M.ValidNewLeader(m)) ∧
∃vslow, vfast, xslow, xfast.
(vslow, vfast, xslow, xfast are computed from view, val, cert, pre_view, cur_val as in lines 7-9) ∧
(vslow ≥ vfast ∧ vslow > 0 =⇒ x = xslow) ∧ (vslow < vfast =⇒ x = xfast)
In view 1 the leader can propose without waiting for NEWLEADER messages, and processes can
avoid sending these messages to this leader.
Safety
I Proposition 54. ∀v, C, x. prepared(C, v, hash(x)) ∧ wf(C) =⇒ valid(x).
This proposition implies that the protocol satisfies Validity. We next prove Agreement.
I Proposition 55. The variables curr_view, pre_view and locked_view at a correct process
never decrease and we always have locked_view ≤ pre_view ≤ curr_view.
I Proposition 56.
∀v, C,C ′, x, x′. prepared(C, v, hash(x))∧prepared(C ′, v, hash(x′))∧wf(C)∧wf(C ′) =⇒ x = x′.
Let
committed_slow(C, v, h) ⇐⇒ ∃Q. quorum(Q) ∧ C = {〈COMMITTED(v, h)〉j | pj ∈ Q};
committed_fast(C, v, h) ⇐⇒ C = {〈PREPARED(v, h)〉j | pj ∈ P}.
I Proposition 57.
∀v, C, h. committed_slow(C, v, h) ∧ wf(C) =⇒ ∃C ′. prepared(C ′, v, h) ∧ wf(C ′).
I Proposition 58.
∀v, C,C ′, h, h′. committed_fast(C, v, h) ∧ wf(C) ∧ prepared(C ′, v, h′) ∧ wf(C ′) =⇒ h = h′.
I Lemma 59.
∀v, v′, x, x′,m. (committed_slow(_, v, hash(x)) ∨ committed_fast(_, v, hash(x))) ∧
m = 〈PROPOSE(v′, x′, _)〉_ ∧ wf(m) ∧ SafeProposal(m) =⇒ x′ = x.
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Proof. Fix v, C and x and assume
committed_slow(C, v, hash(x)) ∨ committed_fast(C, v, hash(x)).
We prove by induction on v′ that
∀m, v′, x′.m = 〈PROPOSE(v′, x′, _)〉_ ∧ wf(m) ∧ SafeProposal(m) =⇒ x′ = x.
Assume this holds for all v′ < v∗; we now prove it for v′ = v∗. To this end, assume v < v′
and m = 〈PROPOSE(v′, x′,M)〉_ is a sent message such that SafeProposal(m). Note that from
the induction hypothesis it follows that
∀C ′′, v′′, x′′. v < v′′ < v′ ∧ prepared(C ′′, v′′, hash(x′′)) ∧ wf(C ′′) =⇒ x = x′′.
Furthermore, by Propositions 56, 57, and 58 we have
∀C ′′, x′′. prepared(C ′′, v, hash(x′′)) ∧ wf(C ′′) =⇒ x = x′′,
so that overall we get
∀C ′′, v′′, x′′. v ≤ v′′ < v′ ∧ prepared(C ′′, v′′, hash(x′′)) ∧ wf(C ′′) =⇒ x = x′′. (32)
Let
M = {〈NEWLEADER(v′, viewj , valj , certj , pre_viewj , cur_valj)〉j | pj ∈ Q}.
for a quorum Q. Since SafeProposal(m), we have ∀m′ ∈M.ValidNewLeader(m′), so that
∀pj ∈ Q. viewj ≤ pre_viewj < v′ ∧
(viewj 6= 0 =⇒ prepared(certj , viewj , hash(valj)) ∧ wf(certj)). (33)
From this and (32) we get that
∀pj ∈ Q. viewj ≥ v =⇒ valj = x. (34)
Let R be the set of correct processes in Q. By induction hypothesis, for any v′′ such that
v < v′′ < v′, a process in R cannot accept a PROPOSE(v′′, h′′, _) message for h′′ 6= hash(x).
Then, since (33) implies pre_viewj < v′, we get
∀pj ∈ R. pre_viewj > v =⇒ cur_valj = x. (35)
Let vslow, vfast, xslow, xfast be computed from view, val, cert, pre_view, cur_val as in lines 7-
9. Then SafeProposal(m) implies
(vslow ≥ vfast ∧ vslow > 0 =⇒ x′ = xslow) ∧ (vslow < vfast =⇒ x′ = xfast). (36)
We now consider two cases, depending on whether committed_slow(C, v, hash(x)) or
committed_fast(C, v, hash(x)).
1. committed_slow(C, v, hash(x)). In this case a quorum Q′ of processes
sent COMMITTED(v, hash(x)). The quorums Q and Q′ have to intersect in
some correct process pk, which has thus sent both COMMITTED(v, hash(x)) and
NEWLEADER(v′, viewk, valk, certk, pre_viewj , cur_valj). Since v < v′, this process pk must
have sent the COMMITTED message before the NEWLEADER message. Before sending
COMMITTED(v, hash(x)) the process set locked_view to v (line 19). Then by Proposition 55
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process pk must have had locked_view ≥ v when it sent the NEWLEADER message. Hence,
viewk ≥ v and max{viewj | pj ∈ Q} ≥ v. Then from (34) for any j such that
viewj = max{viewk | pk ∈ Q} we must have valj = x, so that
vslow ≥ v ∧ xslow = x. (37)
Since |R| ≥ |Q| − f , from (35) for the D defined in line 9 we get
∀(x′′, v′′) ∈ D. v′′ > v =⇒ x′′ = x.
Hence,
vfast > v =⇒ xfast = x.
From this, (37) and (36) we get x′ = x, as required.
2. committed_fast(C, v, hash(x)). Then each process in R sent PREPARED(v, hash(x)), and
this must have happened before it sent the NEWLEADER message for view v′. Hence, by
Proposition 55, when each process in R sent its NEWLEADER message for view v′, it had
pre_view ≥ v. Hence,
∀pj ∈ R. pre_viewj ≥ v. (38)
Since a correct process can accept only a single proposal in a view, we have
∀pj ∈ R. pre_viewj = v =⇒ cur_valj = x.
Together with (35), this yields
∀pj ∈ R. pre_viewj ≥ v =⇒ cur_valj = x.
This and (38) give ∀pj ∈ R. cur_valj = x. Then for the D defined in line 9, we get
∀(x′′, v′′) ∈ D. v′′ ≥ v ∧ x′′ = x.
Furthermore, since |R| ≥ |Q| − f ≥ f + 1, we also have D 6= ∅, so that
vfast ≥ v ∧ xfast = x. (39)
Finally, (34) implies
vslow ≥ v =⇒ xslow = x.
From this, (39) and (36) we get x′ = x, as required. uunionsq
I Corollary 60. SBFT satisfies Agreement.
Liveness
I Theorem 61. Assume all processes are correct and let v ≥ V be a view such that F (v) > 5δ.
Then all processes decide at v by Elast(v) + 3δ.
Proof. By Property 2, we have Efirst(v) ≥ GST, so that all messages sent by correct
processes after Efirst(v) get delivered to all correct processes within δ. Once a correct process
enters v, it sends its NEWLEADER message, so that leader(v) is guaranteed to receive a quorum
of NEWLEADER messages by Elast(v) + δ. When this happens, the leader will send its proposal
in a PROPOSE message, which correct processes will receive by Elast(v) + 2δ. If all processes
deem the proposal safe, then by Elast(v) + 3δ, every process will receive 3f + 1 matching
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PREPARED messages and decide. By (2), all correct processes will stay in v until at least
Elast(v) + (F (v)− d) > Elast(v) + 3δ. Thus, the above sequence of message exchanges will
complete before any of them exits view v, and all correct processes will decide in this view
by the time Elast(v) + 3δ.
It remains to show that the proposal leader(v) makes in view v (line 5) will be deemed
safe by all processes according to the SafeProposal predicate (line 13). All the conjuncts of
SafeProposal except for valid(x) are trivially satisfied given that leader(v) is correct. If the
leader is choosing its own proposal as x, then it is valid because correct processes propose
valid values. If the leader is choosing xslow as x, then from ValidNewLeader we get that
prepared(C, _, hash(xslow)) for a well-formed C. Hence, by Proposition 54 we again have
valid(x). Finally, if the leader is choosing xfast as x, then f + 1 processes sent x in their
NEWLEADER message. Thus, at least one process has checked the validity of x. Hence, we
again have valid(x). uunionsq
I Theorem 62. Let v ≥ V be a view such that Ff (v) > 2δ, F (v)−Ff (v) > 5δ (so that F (v) >
7δ) and leader(v) is correct. Then all correct processes decide at v by Elast(v) + Ff (v) + 3δ.
Proof. By Property 2, we have Efirst(v) ≥ GST, so that all messages sent by correct
processes after Efirst(v) get delivered to all correct processes within δ. Once a correct process
enters v, it sends its NEWLEADER message, so that leader(v) is guaranteed to receive a quorum
of NEWLEADER messages by Elast(v) + δ. When this happens, the leader will send its proposal
in a PROPOSE message, which correct processes will receive by Elast(v) + 2δ. As in the proof
of Theorem 61, we can show that all correct processes will deem the proposal safe. Fix
a correct process pi and let t1 ≤ Elast(v) + 2δ be the time when pi receives the PROPOSE
message. Then every correct process will receive the leader’s PROPOSE message and send
its PREPARED message by t1 + δ. The process pi will thus receive all PREPARED messages
sent by correct processes by t1 + 2δ. The process pi starts timer_fast_path at time t1, and
Ff (v) > 2δ. Thus, by the time timer_fast_path expires at pi, it will have received a quorum
of PREPARED messages. Since pi was picked arbitrarily, this holds for any correct process. A
correct process starts its timer no later than Elast(v) + 2δ, so that every correct process will
send COMMITTED by Elast(v) + 2δ + Ff (v). It then takes at most δ to exchange COMMITTED
messages, leading to decisions. By By (2), all correct processes will stay in v until at least
Elast(v) + (F (v)−d) > Elast(v) +Ff (v) + 3δ. Thus, the above sequence of message exchanges
will complete before any of them exits view v, and all correct processes will decide in this
view by the time Elast(v) + Ff (v) + 3δ. uunionsq
I Corollary 63. Let F and Ff be such that (1) holds and ∀θ.∃v.∀v′. v′ ≥ v =⇒ F (v′) −
Ff (v′) > θ. Then all correct processes eventually decide.
Latency under favorable conditions
I Corollary 64. Assume all processes are correct, Sfirst ≥ GST, F (1) > 4δ and leader(1) is
correct. Then in the SBFT protocol all correct processes decide no later than Slast + 3δ.
SBFT without the extra timer
We can dispense with timer_fast_path in the SBFT protocol. In this variant, as soon as a
process receives a quorum of PREPARED messages at line 24, it sends the COMMITTED messages.
This reduces the latency when the protocol decides through the slow path, and leaves the
fast-path latency unchanged.
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I Theorem 65. Assume that all processes are correct and let v ≥ V be a view such that
F (v) > 5δ. Then in the modified SBFT all processes decide at v by Elast(v) + 3δ.
I Theorem 66. Let v ≥ V be a view such that F (v) > 6δ and leader(v) is correct. Then in
the modified SBFT all correct processes decide at v by Elast(v) + 4δ.
The lower slow-path latency comes at the expense of a higher message complexity, since a
process sends a COMMITTED message even if in the end it decides on the fast path. In contrast,
a process running the previously presented version of SBFT may decide through the fast
path before timer_fast_path expires, and thus avoid sending COMMITTED.
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B.5 Single-Shot Tendermint
1 upon new_view(v)
2 curr_view← v;
3 voted← false;
4 stop_timer(timer_lock);
5 start_timer(timer_lock, Fl(curr_view));
6 if pi = leader(curr_view) then
7 if prepared_view 6= 0 then
8 broadcast 〈PROPOSE(v, prepared_val, prepared_view)〉i;
9 else
10 broadcast 〈PROPOSE(v, myval(), 0)〉i;
11 when received 〈PROPOSE(v, x, _)〉j = m
12 pre: curr_view = v ∧ voted = false ∧ SafeProposal(m);
13 curr_val← x;
14 voted← true;
15 broadcast 〈PREPARED(v, hash(curr_val))〉i;
16 when received {〈PREPARED(v, h)〉j | pj ∈ Q} for a quorum Q
17 pre: curr_view = v ∧ voted = true ∧ hash(curr_val) = h;
18 prepared_val← curr_val;
19 prepared_view← v;
20 if timer_lock has not expired then
21 locked_view← curr_view;
22 locked_val← curr_val;
23 broadcast 〈COMMITTED(v, h)〉i;
24 when received {〈COMMITTED(v, h)〉j | pj ∈ Q} for a quorum Q
25 pre: curr_view = locked_view = v ∧ hash(curr_val) = h;
26 decide(curr_val);
prepared(v, h) ⇐⇒ ∃Q. quorum(Q) ∧ (received {〈PREPARED(v, h)〉j | pj ∈ Q})
SafeProposal(〈PROPOSE(v, x, v′)〉i) ⇐⇒ pi = leader(v) ∧ valid(x) ∧
(locked_view 66= 0 =⇒ x = locked_val ∨ (∃v′. v > v′ > locked_view ∧ prepared(v′, hash(x))))
In Tendermint processes exchange messages using a reliable broadcast primitive (broadcast).
The primitive guarantees that, if a correct process receives a message m by a time t, then all
correct processes will receive m by max{t,GST}+ Θ.
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Safety
The proof of safety is virtually identical to the one for single-shot HotStuff (§B.1) and is
omitted.
Liveness
I Proposition 67. The variables locked_view, prepared_view and curr_view at a correct
process never decrease and we always have locked_view ≤ prepared_view ≤ curr_view.
I Proposition 68. For any v, x, and x′, if prepared(v, hash(x)) and prepared(v, hash(x′)) at
any two correct processes, then x = x′.
I Proposition 69. For any v and x, if prepared(v, hash(x)) at some correct process, then
valid(x).
I Lemma 70. Let v ≥ V be a view such that Fl(v) > 2δ+ 2Θ, F (v) > 2δ+ 3Θ and leader(v)
is correct. Let leader(v).prepared_view = v0 when leader(v) enters view v. Assume that for
each correct process pj we have pj .locked_view ≤ v0 when pj receives the leader’s proposal in
v. Then all correct processes decide in view v by Elast(v) + 3Θ.
Proof By Property 2 we have Efirst(v) ≥ GST, so that all messages broadcast by correct
processes after Efirst(v) get delivered to all correct processes within Θ. When leader(v)
enters view v (no later than Elast(v)), it will broadcast its proposal x in a PROPOSE(v, x, v0)
message, which correct processes will receive by Elast(v) + Θ. We first prove that no later
than Elast(v) + Θ this message will satisfy the SafeProposal predicate at all correct processes.
Assume first that v0 = 0, so that the leader is proposing its own value, which must
be valid because the leader is correct. Then every correct process has locked_view = 0
when receiving the leader’s proposal, and thus the proposal satisfies the last conjunct of
SafeProposal. Hence, every correct process will deem the proposal safe upon its receipt.
Assume now that v0 > 0. Since the leader is correct, we have prepared(v0, hash(x)) at the
leader when it makes the proposal. Hence, by Proposition 69 we have valid(x). Furthermore,
since the messages comprising the quorum of PREPARED(v0, hash(x)) messages received by the
leader were sent by reliable broadcast and Efirst(v) ≥ GST, all correct processes will satisfy
prepared(v0, hash(x)) by Elast(v) + Θ. By the assumption of the lemma, each correct process
pj has pj .locked_view = v′ ≤ v0 when receiving the leader’s proposal. If v′ < v0, then by
Elast(v) + Θ the leader’s proposal will satisfy the last conjunct of SafeProposal and will thus
be deemed safe by pj . If v′ = v0, then by Proposition 68 the process pj has locked_val = x
when it receives the leader’s proposal. Then the leader’s proposal again satisfies the last
conjunct of SafeProposal.
Hence, by Elast(v)+Θ each correct process will receive the leader’s proposal and will deem
it safe. It will then send a PREPARED(v, hash(x)) message, so that all correct processes will
receive a quorum of such messages by Elast(v) + 2Θ. When a process enters a view, it starts
timer_lock, which is set to Fl(v) > 2δ+ 2Θ. By Property 4, we have Efirst(v) ≥ Elast(v)− 2δ,
so that the timer_lock of any correct process cannot expire before Elast(v) + 2Θ. Hence, every
correct process will receive a quorum of PREPARED(v, hash(x)) messages before its timer_lock
expires and will thus send the corresponding COMMITTED message by Elast(v)+2Θ. Afterwards,
it takes correct processes at most Θ to exchange the COMMITTED messages, leading to decisions.
By (2), all correct processes will stay in v until at least Elast(v) + (F (v)− d) > Elast(v) + 3Θ.
Thus, the above sequence of message exchange will complete before any of them exits view v,
and all correct processes will decide in this view by Elast(v) + 3Θ. uunionsq
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I Lemma 71. Let v ≥ V be a view such that Fl(v) > 2δ + 2Θ, F (v)− Fl(v) > 2δ + Θ (so
that F (v) > 4δ + 3Θ) and leader(v) is correct. If a correct process locks a value in v, then all
correct processes will have prepared_view = v when leaving v.
Proof Let t ≥ Efirst(v) ≥ GST be the time when a correct process pi locks a value in view
v. When a correct process enters v, it starts its timer_lock, which defines the period of
time during which a process can lock a value. Thus, the latest time pi can lock a value
in v is Elast(v) + Fl(v), i.e., t ≤ Elast(v) + Fl(v). To lock a value, pi has to receive a
corresponding PROPOSE message and a quorum of PREPARED messages. Since these messages
are sent via reliable broadcast, all correct processes are guaranteed to receive them by
Elast(v) + Fl(v) + Θ. By Property 5 all correct processes will stay in v until at least
Efirst(v) +F (v) > Efirst(v) +Fl(v) + 2δ+ Θ. By Property 4 we have Efirst(v) ≥ Elast(v)− 2δ.
Hence, all correct processes will stay in v until at least Elast(v)+Fl(v)+Θ. Then each correct
process will receive the PROPOSE message and the quorum of PREPARED messages while still
in view v, and will thus set its prepared_view to v before exiting the view, as required. uunionsq
I Theorem 72. Let v ≥ V be a view such that Fl(v) > 2δ + 2Θ, F (v)− Fl(v) > 2δ + Θ (so
that F (v) > 4δ + 3Θ) and leader(v) is correct. Then all correct processes decide in a view no
later than v + 3f by Elast(v) +
∑v+3f−1
k=v (F (k) + δ) + 3Θ.
Proof Consider first the case when each correct process has locked_view = 0 when receiving
the leader’s proposal in v. Then by Lemma 70 all correct processes decide at v by Elast(v)+3Θ.
We now consider the case when some correct process is locked on a value at time Elast(v).
Let pi be a process that is locked on the highest view among correct processes, and let this
view be v0 < v. Assume first that leader(v).prepared_view ≥ v0 when leader(v) enters view v.
Then by Lemma 70, all correct processes decide at v by Elast(v) + 3Θ.
Assume now that that leader(v).prepared_view < v0 when leader(v) enters v, so that
pi 6= leader(v). By the definition of leader(), leaders rotate round-robin, so that for some
view v′ ≤ v + 3f we have leader(v′) = pi. Let v1 ≥ v0 be the highest view locked among
all correct processes at time when they receive the leader’s proposal in v′. We prove that
pi.prepared_view ≥ v1 when pi enters v′. We know that pi was locked at the highest view
v0 < v among all correct processes when these received the leader’s proposal in v. Then
by Proposition 67, pi.prepared_view ≥ v0 when pi enters v′. Thus, if no correct process
locks a value between views v and v′, then v1 = v0, so that pi.prepared_view ≥ v1 when pi
enters v′. On the other hand, if a correct process locks a value between views v and v′, then
v0 < v ≤ v1 < v′ and by Lemma 71 and Proposition 67, pi has pi.prepared_view ≥ v1 when
it enters v′. Thus, in all cases we have pi.prepared_view ≥ v1 when pi enters v′. Then by
Lemma 70 all correct processes decide in view v′ by Elast(v′) + 3Θ. By Proposition 2 we
have Elast(v′) ≤ Elast(v) +
∑v′−1
k=v (F (k) + δ), so that all correct processes decide in view v′
by Elast(v) +
∑v′−1
k=v (F (k) + δ) + 3Θ ≤ Elast(v) +
∑v+3f−1
k=v (F (k) + δ) + 3Θ, as required. uunionsq
I Corollary 73. Let F and Fl be such that (1) holds and ∀Θ.∃v.∀v′. v′ ≥ v =⇒ F (v′) −
Fl(v′) > Θ. Then all correct processes eventually decide.
Latency under favorable conditions
I Corollary 74. Assume that Sfirst ≥ GST, Fl(v) > 2δ + 2Θ and F (v) − Fl(v) > 2δ + Θ.
Then all correct processes decide no later than Slast +
∑f
k=1(F (k) + δ) + δ + 3Θ.
I Corollary 75. Assume that Sfirst ≥ GST, Fl(v) > 2δ + 2Θ, F (v) > 2δ + 3Θ and leader(1)
is correct. Then all correct processes decide no later than Slast + δ + 3Θ.
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C Linear Versions of Consensus Protocols
C.1 Threshold Signatures
The linear versions of the consensus protocols make use of threshold signatures1. A k-out-of-n
threshold signature scheme is a protocol that allows any subset of k processes out of n to
generate a digital signature, but that disallows the creation of a valid signature if fewer than k
processes participate in the protocol. A process pi participates by partially signing a message
m using its private key. A process that gathers a set M of at least k partial signatures for
a message m can combine them into a single compact signature using combine(M). Any
process can then verify the signature using a public key shared by all processes.
We use two threshold signature schemes with k = n (denoted σ) and k = 2f + 1 (denoted
τ). We denote by 〈m〉σi a message m partially signed by process pi using the σ scheme, and
denote by 〈m〉σ a combined signature on a message m. We use similar notation for the τ
scheme.
1 D. Boneh, B. Lynn, and H. Shacham. Short signatures from the Weil pairing. J. Cryptology,
17(4):297–319, 2004.
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C.2 Single-Shot Linear HotStuff
1 upon new_view(v)
2 curr_view← v;
3 voted← false;
4 send 〈NEWLEADER(curr_view, prepared_view, prepared_val, cert)〉i
to leader(curr_view);
5 when received {〈NEWLEADER(b, viewj , valj , certj)〉j | pj ∈ Q} = M
for a quorum Q
6 pre: curr_view = v ∧ pi = leader(v) ∧ (∀m ∈M.ValidNewLeader(m));
7 if ∃j. viewj = max{viewk | pk ∈ Q} 6= 0 then
8 send 〈PROPOSE(v, valj , certj)〉i to all
9 else
10 send 〈PROPOSE(v, myval(),⊥)〉i to all
11 when received 〈PROPOSE(v, x, _)〉j = m
12 pre: curr_view = v ∧ vote = false ∧ SafeProposal(m);
13 curr_val← x;
14 send 〈PREPARED(v, hash(x))〉τi to leader(curr_view);
15 when received {〈PREPARED(v, h)〉τj | pj ∈ Q} = M for a quorum Q
16 pre: curr_view = v ∧ pi = leader(v) ∧ voted = true ∧ hash(curr_val) = h;
17 send 〈PRECOMMIT(v, combine(M))〉i to all;
18 when received 〈PRECOMMIT(v, C)〉j
19 pre: curr_view = v ∧ pj = leader(v) ∧ voted = true ∧
C = 〈PREPARED(v, hash(curr_val))〉τ ;
20 prepared_val← curr_val;
21 prepared_view← curr_view;
22 cert← C;
23 send 〈PRECOMMITTED(v, hash(prepared_val))〉τi to leader(curr_view);
24 when received {〈PRECOMMITTED(v, h)〉τj | pj ∈ Q} = M for a quorum Q
25 pre: curr_view = prepared_view = v ∧ pi = leader(v) ∧ hash(curr_val) = h;
26 send 〈COMMIT(b, combine(M))〉i to all;
27 when received 〈COMMIT(v, C)〉j
28 pre: curr_view = prepared_view = v ∧ pj = leader(v) ∧
C = 〈PRECOMMITTED(v, hash(curr_val))〉τ ;
29 locked_view← prepared_view;
30 send 〈COMMITTED(v, hash(prepared_val))〉τi to leader(prepared_view);
31 when received {〈COMMITTED(v, h)〉τj | pj ∈ Q} = M for a quorum Q
32 pre: curr_view = locked_view = v ∧ pi = leader(v) ∧ hash(curr_val) = h;
33 send 〈DECIDE(v, combine(M))〉i to all;
34 when received 〈DECIDE(v, C)〉j
35 pre: curr_view = locked_view = v ∧ pj = leader(v) ∧
C = 〈COMMITTED(v, hash(curr_val))〉τ ;
36 decide(curr_val);
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ValidNewLeader(〈NEWLEADER(v′, v, x, C)〉_) ⇐⇒
v < v′ ∧ (v 6= 0 =⇒ C = 〈PREPARED(v, hash(x))〉τ )
SafeProposal(〈PROPOSE(v, x, C)〉i) ⇐⇒ pi = leader(v) ∧ valid(x) ∧
(locked_view 66= 0 =⇒ x = prepared_val ∨
(∃v′. v > v′ > locked_view ∧ C = 〈PREPARED(v′, hash(x))〉τ ))
In view 1 the leader can propose without waiting for NEWLEADER messages, and processes can
avoid sending these messages to this leader.
Liveness
I Theorem 76. Let v ≥ V be a view such that F (v) > 10δ and leader(v) is correct. Then
all correct processes decide in view v by Elast(v) + 8δ.
I Corollary 77. Let F be such that (1) holds. Then all correct processes eventually decide.
Latency under favorable conditions
I Corollary 78. Assume that Sfirst ≥ GST and F (1) > 10δ. Then in the linear HotStuff
protocol all correct processes decide no later than Slast +
∑f
k=1(F (k) + δ) + 8δ.
I Corollary 79. Assume that Sfirst ≥ GST, F (1) > 9δ and leader(1) is correct. Then in the
linear HotStuff protocol all correct processes decide no later than Slast + 8δ.
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C.3 Single-Shot Linear SBFT
1 upon new_view(v)
2 curr_view← v;
3 voted← false;
4 send 〈NEWLEADER(curr_view, locked_view, prepared_val, cert, pre_view, curr_val)〉i
to leader(curr_view);
5 when received
{〈NEWLEADER(v, viewj , valj , certj , pre_viewj , cur_valj)〉j | pj ∈ Q} = M
for a quorum Q
6 pre: curr_view = v ∧ pi = leader(v) ∧ (∀m ∈M.ValidNewLeader(m));
7 let (xslow, vslow)← (⊥, 0);
8 if ∃j. viewj = max{viewk | pk ∈ Q} 6= 0 then (xslow, vslow)← (valj , viewj);
9 let D ← {〈x, v′〉 | ∃P ⊆ Q. |P | = f + 1 ∧ (∀pj ∈ P. cur_valj = x) ∧
v′ = min{pre_viewj | pj ∈ P}};
10 let (xfast, vfast)← (⊥,max{v′ | 〈_, v′〉 ∈ D});
11 if ∃!x. 〈x, vfast〉 ∈ D then xfast ← x else vfast = 0;
12 stop_timer(timer_fast_path);
13 start_timer(timer_fast_path, Ff (curr_view));
14 if vslow ≥ vfast ∧ vslow > 0 then
15 send 〈PROPOSE(v, xslow,M)〉i to all;
16 else if vfast > vslow then
17 send 〈PROPOSE(v, xfast,M)〉i to all;
18 else
19 send 〈PROPOSE(v, myval(),M)〉i to all;
20 when received 〈PROPOSE(v, x, _)〉j = m
21 pre: curr_view = v ∧ voted = false ∧ SafeProposal(m);
22 curr_val← x;
23 pre_view← curr_view;
24 voted← true;
25 send 〈PREPARED(v, hash(curr_val))〉τi to leader(curr_view);
26 send 〈PREPARED(v, hash(curr_val))〉σi to leader(curr_view);
27 when received {〈PREPARED(v, h)〉σi | pj ∈ P} = M
28 pre: curr_view = v ∧ pi = leader(v) ∧ voted = true ∧ hash(curr_val) = h;
29 send 〈DECIDE_FAST(v, combine(M))〉i to all;
30 when received 〈DECIDE_FAST(v, C)〉j
31 pre: curr_view = v ∧ pj = leader(b) ∧ voted = true ∧
C = 〈PREPARED(v, hash(curr_val))〉σ;
32 decide(curr_val);
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33 when timer_fast_path expired and received {〈PREPARED(v, h)〉τj | pj ∈ Q} = M
for at least quorum Q
34 pre: curr_view = v ∧ pi = leader(v) ∧ voted = true ∧ hash(curr_val) = h;
35 send 〈COMMIT(v, combine(M))〉i to all;
36 when received 〈COMMIT(v, C)〉j
37 pre: curr_view = v ∧ pj = leader(v) ∧ voted = true ∧
C = 〈PREPARED(v, hash(curr_val))〉τ ;
38 prepared_val← curr_val;
39 locked_view← curr_view;
40 cert← C;
41 send 〈COMMITTED(v, hash(prepared_val))〉τi to leader(curr_view);
42 when received {〈COMMITTED(v, h)〉τj | pj ∈ Q} = M for a quorum Q
43 pre: curr_view = locked_view = v ∧ pi = leader(v) ∧ hash(curr_val) = h;
44 send 〈DECIDE_SLOW(v, combine(M))〉i to all;
45 when received 〈DECIDE_SLOW(v, C)〉j
46 pre: curr_view = locked_view = v ∧ pj = leader(b) ∧
C = 〈COMMITTED(v, hash(curr_val))〉τ ;
47 decide(curr_val);
ValidNewLeader(〈NEWLEADER(v′, v, x, C, v0, x0)〉_) ⇐⇒
v ≤ v0 < v′ ∧ (v 6= 0 =⇒ C = 〈PREPARED(v, hash(x))〉τ )
SafeProposal(〈PROPOSE(v, x,M)〉i) ⇐⇒
pi = leader(v) ∧ valid(x) ∧
∃Q, view, val, cert, pre_view, cur_val. quorum(Q) ∧
M = {〈NEWLEADER(v, viewj , valj , certj , pre_viewj , cur_valj)〉j | pj ∈ Q} ∧
(∀m ∈M.ValidNewLeader(m)) ∧
∃vslow, vfast, xslow, xfast.
(vslow, vfast, xslow, xfast are computed from view, val, cert, pre_view, cur_val as in lines 7-11) ∧
(vslow ≥ vfast ∧ vslow > 0 =⇒ x = xslow) ∧ (vslow < vfast =⇒ x = xfast)
In view 1 the leader can propose without waiting for NEWLEADER messages, and processes can
avoid sending these messages to this leader.
Liveness
I Theorem 80. Assume that all processes are correct and let v ≥ V be a view such that
F (v) > 6δ. Then all processes decide at v by Elast(v) + 4δ.
I Theorem 81. Let v ≥ V be a view such that Ff (v) > 2δ, F (v)−Ff (v) > 6δ (so that F (v) >
8δ) and leader(v) is correct. Then all correct processes decide at v by Elast(v) + Ff (v) + 4δ.
I Corollary 82. Let F and Ff be such that (1) holds and ∀θ.∃v.∀v′. v′ ≥ v =⇒ F (v′) −
Ff (v′) > θ. Then all correct processes eventually decide.
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Latency under favorable conditions
I Corollary 83. Assume all processes are correct, Sfirst ≥ GST, F (1) > 5δ and leader(1) is
correct. Then in the linear SBFT protocol all correct processes decide no later than Slast + 4δ.
Linear SBFT without the extra timer
Like with the all-to-all SBFT protocol of §B.4, we can dispense with timer_fast_path in the
linear SBFT protocol. In this variant, as soon as the leader receives a quorum of PREPARED
messages at line 33, it sends the COMMIT messages. This again reduces the slow-path latency
at the expense of a higher message complexity.
I Theorem 84. Assume that all processes are correct and let v ≥ V be a view such that
F (v) > 6δ. Then in the modified linear SBFT all processes decide at v by Elast(v) + 4δ.
I Theorem 85. Let v ≥ V be a view such that F (v) > 8δ and leader(v) is correct. Then in
the modified linear SBFT all correct processes decide at v by Elast(v) + 6δ.
